

The Rise of the Global South: Implications for the Provisioning of Global Public Goods

By Inge Kaul*

Introduction

More and more policy challenges are of a global, border-transgressing nature. Examples would be the mitigation of global climate change, communicable disease control, international financial stability, the fight against terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation. Economists categorize these challenges as global public goods – things or conditions that potentially affect many, if not all, countries, the provision of which is neglected by market actors, and which no country, however powerful, can effectively address alone, through unilateral action. Rather, they require a global policy response based on effective international cooperation.

Many of these challenges are of an increasingly urgent nature, compelling us to fundamentally rethink and reorient current growth and development strategies. Just think of the ‘closing door’ opportunity of limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius in order to stabilize the climate; the “end of oil”, and hence, the need to develop – within the next couple of decades – new alternative energy sources to achieve energy security. Or, consider the specter of land and water scarcity; ever-fiercer competition for market shares, investment and job opportunities; growing global inequity; and the still persisting problems of nuclear proliferation, world hunger and poverty.

These risks must be addressed expeditiously. Moreover, as the World Economic Forum’s report on Global Risks (2011) warned, the world cannot afford any further major challenge, especially now that global economic resilience has been weakened by the recent international financial crises.

Yet, in many issue areas, international cooperation on the selection and provisioning of global public goods continues to be slow and hesitant, allowing problems to persist and to assume ever more serious proportions. Could it be that a reason for this lagging progress in meeting global public goods challenges be that the world is currently moving through a period of profound change in global power relations, notably a shift towards multi-polarity resulting from the growing economic and political strength of the emerging-market economies? Is this change perhaps impairing international cooperation in support of global public goods?

The present paper will explore these questions, focusing on the role of the Global South, in particular that of its state actors, in global policymaking.¹

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Section I of the paper introduces the notions of public goods and global public goods and analyzes the governance risks and demands that these goods present. Section II discusses the conditions that would, accordingly, need to be met in order for international cooperation to work effectively in the presence of global public goods. It identifies five facilitating conditions: open and participatory international decision-making; global governance based on the principle of subsidiarity; issue-specific negotiations; a globally embedded definition of national interest in a global context; and legitimate global policy leadership. With these criteria in mind, and based on select empirical evidence, Section III then assesses how the participation of developing countries has evolved during recent decades, the impact it has had on the functioning of international cooperation and on the provisioning of global public goods.

The analysis shows that, as a group, the developing countries have become increasingly active participants in global policymaking. Moreover, they have used their influence not only to further their own, narrowly defined national interests but also to shape the normative framework of global policymaking by emphasizing concerns like enhancing the fairness and justice of international negotiations or foster a better balance between growth and development as well as public and private interests. An example is their engagement in furthering enhanced coherence between protecting intellectual property rights and meeting public health goals.

International cooperation now is a more open and participatory process and, thus, more in line with the conditions identified in this paper as favorable to effective global public goods provision. Nevertheless, progress is as yet far from satisfactory, because the identified conditions have, so far, been only partially met and countries have advanced at different speeds, allowing only some of them, mainly the more advanced emerging-market countries, to join the group of major global policy-shapers, but leaving many other countries of the Global South still in the position of global policy-takers.

Among the main factors, so far, holding back a fuller participation of developing countries in global governance appear to be capacity constraints and, no doubt often justified, sovereignty concerns. Also, developing countries have so far pursued a strategy of integration that accepts the existing system as a given fact. Yet signs are multiplying that this phase may soon be coming to an end.

In this way international cooperation could become ever more difficult at a time when it is most urgently needed. The reason for this is that the countries of the Global North have responded to the strengthening role of the Global South as a global policy-shaper with growing sovereignty concerns of their own. They have followed a strategy of venue shifting, taking issues of importance to them into forums like the Bretton Woods institutions, in which decision-making is still weighted in their favor, or by setting up new informal, smaller negotiation venues where they can define the agenda as well as the circle of participants. An early expression of this strategy was the creation of the Group of 7 major industrial countries

¹ The present paper thus captures only one aspect, albeit still an important aspect, of the role of the Global South in international cooperation. A more detailed analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper, would have to take into account the role that developing-country scholars and think-tanks like the South Centre or the Group of 24 (G-24), national and international civil-society, actors of the Global North with a special interest in development and global equity, as well as multilateral organizations, especially the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have played in facilitating the changes identified here.

(G-7) in the early 1970s.² Another strategy has been growing reliance on bilateralism. Together with increasing South-South cooperation and regionalism, these trends have led to a world of multilateralism that, in the words of Haass (2010), is more fluid, less predictable, and consequently, „messy”.

But is this messiness, as Haass (2010) argues, desirable? The analysis in this paper suggests it is not.

Due to a lack of transparency, predictability, and consequently, lack of trust and legitimacy, the current messiness might encourage rivalry among states and zero-sum thinking where, instead, fair, rule-based and accountable international cooperation would be the better strategy – for all.

Thus, the time appears to be ripe for the North and the South to initiate consultations and enter into negotiations on the redesign of global governance in order to resolve today’s sovereignty paradox: states losing national policymaking sovereignty, because they are holding on to a conventional notion of ‘absolute’ national policymaking sovereignty, and therefore, giving preference to unilateralism, sometimes even protectionism, where, in contrast, the better strategy would be for all to realize their national public-policy interests in establishing a system of fair and effective international cooperation.

Due to this paradoxical situation the world today lacks two critically important global public goods that could function as international coordination mechanisms of individual activity, state and nonstate, viz.: a well-functioning system of multilateral cooperation and well-regulated international markets. The fact that these two goods are underprovided appears to be a reason for the policy stalemates in which so many other global challenges find themselves trapped today.

Clearly, the latter, well-regulated markets, depend on the former, a well-functioning system of global, multilateral governance. States, first, need to agree on ‘taming’ their temptation to free-ride in the presence of global public goods before they might muster the requisite willing to cooperate in order to ‘tame’ global markets. After all, markets as institutions also have public-good properties. They, too, are things in the public domain that could potentially affect all, for better or worse; and if they are of worldwide scope, they constitute global public goods.

In sum, the main implication of the confluence of the rise of the Global South and the growing importance of global public goods is that, once again, the international community would need to address the most fundamental global-public-good issue, namely the issue of world order. States last addressed this issue in the 1940s when they deliberated and agreed on the United Nations Charter. Then the key issue was the inviolability of national territorial and policymaking borders. Now that states’ economic borders have, once again, become more open, the key issue would be how to combine national policymaking sovereignty with economic openness.

The policy option suggested here, as a conjecture for further study and debate, is for states to renew their commitment to national sovereignty by agreeing that the future world

² The G-7, the Group of seven major industrial countries, became the G-8 when Russia joined after the end of the cold war. For more information on this Group that is now commonly referred to as the G-8, see <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/>.

order ought to rest on two closely related principles: first, the principle of responsible sovereignty – defined as policymaking sovereignty that takes the outside world into account when formulating national policy; and second, the principle of global justice – defined as fairness of international negotiations that draws its effectiveness, among other things, from national-level fairness, that is, national policies that allow all to benefit from and, in their own interest, support international cooperation.

In order to see more clearly why a world order based on these two principles would be required in order to achieve a more adequate provisioning of global public goods and, hence, more balanced and sustainable growth and development, it is useful, at the outset, to take a closer look at public goods and global public goods.

I Introducing Public Goods and Global Public Goods

Global, border-transgressing policy issues are nothing new. Let us recall the issue of unhindered access to the high seas that is the subject of the ‘mare liberum’ agreement of 1609. While not all global issues are new, they are of growing importance. Given that the world of today is emerging from a several-century long struggle of establishing national territories and forging consensus on such principles as national policymaking sovereignty and non-interference by outside forces into the domestic affairs of states, the transnationalness of global issues poses the question of how well these issues fit into the existing systems of governance, both nationally and internationally.

In order to understand the governance challenges that these issues present, it is useful to examine them through the analytical lens of public goods. As we will see, many of these issues possess the properties of public goods. They constitute global public goods, confronting policymakers not only with many of the challenges that the provision of public goods in the national context is known to present but also, as the following discussion shows, with new and additional governance risks and requirements. Importantly, they entail deepening policy interdependence among countries, requiring states to engage in international cooperation in order to ensure the availability of goods like financial stability or good public health conditions within their jurisdiction.

A major reason for this lies in the dual publicness of the goods – their publicness in consumption (that is, their availability in the public domain) as well as their publicness in provision (that is, the fact that their availability in any one country requires concerted efforts on the part of many, if not all, countries).³

1 The defining characteristics of public goods and global public goods

Standard economic theory distinguishes between two main categories of goods: private goods and public goods.⁴

Goods that can be parceled out and made excludable, so that clear property rights can be attached to them, are categorized as *private goods*.

³ The discussion in this section draws on Kaul and Mendoza (2003). The interested reader may also refer to: Barrett (2007), International Task Force on Global Public Goods (2006), Kaul et al. (1999), and Sandler (2004).

⁴ It should be stressed at the outset that the term ‘good’ is being used here for reasons of brevity in order to refer to things, products, services, and conditions. It does not have a value connotation, and thus, does not refer to ‘good’ as opposed to ‘bad’.

Public goods, by contrast, are goods that are nonexcludable, meaning that the goods' effects (benefits or costs) are there for all. If a good is nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption so that one person's use of the good or being affected by it does not diminish its availability to others, the good is said to be pure public. Examples are the light of a candle, the service provided by a street sign, or peace and security. If a good possesses only one of these properties it is impure public. The atmosphere, for example, is nonexcludable but rival in consumption, because unrestricted pollution can change its gas composition and contribute to global warming. Patented pharmaceutical knowledge illustrates a nonrival good whose use has, at least for a limited period of time, been made excludable: it requires the explicit permission of, and often, royalty payments to, the inventor. So, patented knowledge, too, falls into the category of impure public goods.

The public effects of a good can be of different spatial – local, national, regional or worldwide – reach; and they can span across one or several generations. If a good's benefits or costs are of nearly universal reach, spanning all countries, or if it could potentially affect anyone anywhere, it is a global public good. Alongside regional public goods, global public goods constitute the category of transnational public goods.⁵

2 A closer look at publicness

For an understanding of the policy challenges that global public goods pose and the provision constraints they may encounter, it is especially useful to consider the following aspects in more detail.

PUBLICNESS AND PRIVATENESS AS A POLICY CHOICE: The standard economics definition of public goods fails to distinguish between a good's potential publicness and its *de facto* publicness. Yet this distinction is increasingly important. Due to a number of change processes, including technological advances, strengthened policy design skills, increased porosity between markets and states, as well as greater political and social freedoms, it has become more and more evident that publicness and privateness are in most cases not innate properties of a good but social constructs, a policy choice. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the potential and *de facto* publicness of a good. For example, land can be freely accessible to all; or it can be fenced in and made excludable. Similarly, certain facts can be kept secret or be publicized.

Goods that are *de facto* public, which is to say, actually in the public domain, may be there for three main reasons. First, making them excludable may be technically impossible or too expensive. Second, they may have been deliberately placed into the public domain and made nonexcludable and nonrival, as street signs have been. Third, goods may be public by default, due to policy neglect (which often allows air pollution to continue) or through lack of information (which has, for example, led to harmful substances being consumed before their ill-effects were recognized).

GLOBALNESS AS A SPECIAL FORM OF PUBLICNESS: Globalness, or the fact that the benefits and costs of some goods have nearly universal coverage, can be viewed as a special

⁵ To be clear, the term “global”, when used in reference to the consumption properties, that is, the benefits or costs of a public good, means trans-boundary, border-transgressing or worldwide. When the term is used later in this chapter in reference to the goods' provision path, it indicates that action has to be taken by actors worldwide, and, as the case may be, nationally and internationally.

form of publicness and also as a policy choice. Certainly, some global public goods such as the moonlight have always had the property of global publicness. They are by nature global and public. Other public goods, however, have changed their properties from, for example, being national (including local) public goods to being global public goods. The reason is that globalization and global public goods are intrinsically linked. In fact, global public goods are both drivers and consequences of globalization.⁶

An example of a global public good that facilitates the globalization process is the universal postal system. It has emerged through a harmonization of national postal systems and thus illustrates a case of the intended globalization of a formerly national public good. Another case in point is the multilateral trade regime that requires cross-border policy harmonization in a large number of policy domains. Today, more and more national public goods have been subjected to such behind-the-border harmonization. They range from trade and investment regimes to human rights norms. In all of these cases, public goods that were formerly provided in more country-specific ways have undergone a globalization process, being turned from national public goods into global public goods, sometimes only after years of protracted multilateral negotiations.

Yet alongside these intended globalization processes, like the creation of more integrated markets, has come unintended globalization, and with it, a further globalization of formerly national public goods. For example, more intense and frequent shipping and travel activity has facilitated the spread of communicable diseases. Financial market integration has allowed the contagion effects of financial crises to spread more speedily and more widely.

Increased openness of national borders has led to an increasingly closer intertwining of national public domains and a deepening interdependence among countries. As a result, the availability of more and more public goods, specifically GPGs, in any country today depends on policy actions taken or not taken in other countries.

PUBLICNESS IN UTILITY AS DISTINCT FROM PUBLICNESS IN CONSUMPTION: Just as preferences for private goods (e.g. houses, books or clothing) vary, so do preferences for public goods, especially those for global public goods. This is because many socio-economic and political differences are wider between countries than within countries.

Thus, publicness in consumption differs from publicness in utility. An African woman who faces a high risk of maternal mortality is more likely to prefer an enhanced publicness of relevant medical and pharmaceutical knowledge than, say, international financial stability or even investment in mitigating climate change, as even her children might not live long enough to face the full consequences of this latter change process.

In which way and to what extent a public good, notably a global public good, affects the welfare and well-being of different population groups depends not only on the overall provision level of the good but also on how it is shaped. For example, all countries face the same multilateral trade regime. But different groups of countries and even different groups of people within countries may, in distinct ways, gain or lose from this regime as a result of how particular norms have been shaped.

⁶ Much of what is being discussed here about the globalization of formerly national public goods would also apply to processes of regionalization. In fact, some formerly national public goods may simultaneously undergo both regionalization and globalization.

Similarly, while many agree on the desirability of international peace and security, the views on how to generate this global public good may vary widely, as the debates in the United Nations Security Council have repeatedly shown, including, most recently, its resolutions on Syria.⁷

3 Risks of underprovision

The provision of public goods, including that of global public goods, typically consists of two closely intertwined processes: a political process of determining which goods to provide, how much of each, in which ways and at what costs and benefits to whom; and an operational process aimed at the actual production of the good.

The political process in particular could encounter incentive problems like free-riding or lack of fairness, whereas the operational or production process could especially encounter problems resulting from the foreign/domestic divide that has been a key characteristic of the Westphalian nation-state world order that we have known.

DUAL – ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACTOR FAILURE: As alluded to earlier, public goods face risks of underprovision due to their properties of publicness, that is, their being in the public domain. This fact might prompt individual actors to attempt to free-ride, letting others step forward and provide the good, and then, when it is available, enjoying it also – without having had to contribute.

Within the national policy context, the state often steps in and helps resolve such collective-action or market-failure problems. Yet, the institution of the state has no full equivalent at the international level. Only a few international organizations, among them the United Nations Security Council and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been endowed with limited coercive powers.⁸ For the most part, international cooperation among states has to happen voluntarily. In fact, when appearing internationally, states, or more precisely, their national negotiating teams, tend to pursue national, particular (and hence, quasi-private) interests that may not necessarily be in line with global exigencies and goals. Moreover, during these negotiations, states bargain over the exchange of policy commitments. Accordingly, international venues can be likened to markets – they can be viewed as political markets.⁹

As a result, global public goods may even face a higher risk than national public goods of being exposed to free-riding, because they may cause economic market failure as well as state or political market failure.¹⁰ Problems of such dual market failure could especially occur in the case of global challenges that depend for their adequate provision on changed behavior of a large number of actors, because many actors might feel that their contribution to the

⁷ See, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc/unsc_news.shtml/.

⁸ In the case of the United Nations (UN), for example, only very few decisions are of a binding nature, namely those taken by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (see, Malone 2007). Another exception to the generally non-binding nature of international agreements is the Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization.

⁹ On the concept of political markets, see also Furubotn and Richter, 2000, p. 420 ff.

¹⁰ It should be noted that the type of state failure referred to here is not to be confounded with the government failure on which public choice scholars tend to focus and which is due to self-interested behavior of individual politicians and bureaucrats (see, Mueller 2003). The state failure identified here is of a systemic nature. It has its roots in the present world order that is still very much centered on the principles of national policymaking sovereignty.

problem or to any proposed corrective action is insignificant. Similarly, global challenges that impose costs for corrective action on current generations for the benefit of future generations are also especially prone to free-riding and underprovision. Mitigation of climate change is a challenge that faces both these risks.¹¹

INSTITUTIONAL FRICTIONS: As shown in Figures 1 and 2, many and perhaps even most global public goods emerge from a summation process that brings together required national-level inputs, notably national public goods provided in a harmonized and concerted manner, complemented by international-level inputs.

Figures 1 and 2 close to here

The international-level inputs could include elements like an international agreement that provides the common policy framework for the decentralized provision of national-level contributions, including the management of cross-border spillovers.¹² International-level inputs could also involve the creation of an international-level good such as the establishment of an international organization to serve as a meeting and negotiating venue and secretariat.¹³

It is because many global public goods emerge from such a summation process of primarily national-level inputs that more and more policymakers, even those of the most powerful countries, are beginning to recognize that in many cases no country alone can tackle global challenges. Meeting these challenges requires effective international cooperation; and this means international cooperation that is fair and mutually beneficial in order to make sense for all and be incentive-compatible – it must generate the requisite willingness to cooperate.

Global public goods thus entail not only consumption interdependence but also provision interdependence. This implies that when taking national policy decisions states have to take account not only of the policy preferences of their national constituencies but also of the outside world, e.g. the preferences of other countries, the global normative framework, or exigencies like global warming; and they have to do so in their own, national self-interest, that is, in order to ensure that the good is available for their constituencies.

¹¹ To illustrate, carbon emissions are diffuse externalities. Once emitted into the atmosphere they cannot be traced back to the emitter, although, of course, it is possible in other ways to assess the carbon footprint of countries. Diffuse externalities also tend to be substitutable so that a corrective action by one party could be offset by inaction on the part of others, a fact that makes it so important for all countries to move in tandem. However, at the same time, worldwide concerted action not only by all countries but by all people in all countries is difficult to achieve. Due to the large number of actors involved, its risk of suffering from free-riding is especially high, because each actor may view her/his contribution as unimportant; therefore, they may not be strongly motivated to contribute. Yet, if a large number of people acted in this way, a high level of underprovision would result.

¹² Spillover effects or externalities are the public effects that arise from the activities of an individual actor but are not taken into account in the actor's production or consumption decisions. CO₂ emissions arising from logging or car driving are an example.

¹³ Three main types of provision paths can be distinguished. Besides the above mentioned summation process they also include a weak-link process and a best-shot approach. Whereas in the case of a summation process the overall availability of the GPG depends on each actor's contribution, it is the contribution of the weakest element of the supply chain that, in the case of a weak-link process, determines the good's overall availability. Dyke-building is an example of a weak-link effort. A best-shot approach results when one actor, an individual, firm or any other entity, produces the good. An example is an invention like that of the wheel. Once invented and left in the public domain, it need not be reinvented.

II Identifying Conditions that Facilitate Effective International Cooperation in Support of Global Public Goods

In light of the foregoing analysis, as well as keeping in mind the phenomenon of global power shifts, it seems that a more adequate provision of global public goods necessitates a five-pronged set of global governance reforms aimed at:

- 1- A better matching of the circles of stakeholders and decision-makers so that all can have an effective voice in global matters that concern them;
- 2- Following the principle of subsidiarity in order to avoid both the risk of over-centralization and inefficiency in international negotiations caused by an overcrowding of international agendas;
- 3- Building bridges across the existing organizational lines in order to facilitate the multi-level, multi-sector and, of course, multi-actor production that many global public goods require;
- 4- Taking the outside world, i.e. the expectations of other countries, global norms and environmental exigencies, into account when formulating national policy; and
- 5- Encouraging legitimate global leadership to assist the international community, as and if necessary, in avoiding policy traps that could lead to serious global crises.

In more detail, the reasons for these reforms are as follows.

1—MATCHING THE CIRCLES OF STAKEHOLDERS AND DECISIONMAKERS: Given that we live in a world of individual sovereign nation states, country conditions, and hence, national preferences for global public goods may vary widely while all may be affected by them, it appears to be important, for reasons of input legitimacy as well as policy ownership and commitment, to ensure that the circles of stakeholders and decision-makers are well matched. Put differently, decision-making on goods that are public in consumption would perhaps best be organized as an open and participatory process so that all could have an effective say in matters that concern them. Democracy should not end at national borders but be extended to the international level – in the form of process fairness and justice.¹⁴

Genuine participation may help promote fairness as well as efficiency, because it creates room for an exchange and competition of ideas that may lead to better fitting, more effective, and thus, more sustainable policy outcomes.¹⁵

To the extent that democracy spreads and deepens at the national level, democracy at the international level may have to follow suit, lest policymakers, who are being perceived by national constituencies as mere global policy-takers, might then lose legitimacy and authority at home, perhaps also weakening their ability to translate international agreements into national policy.

Moreover, where all concerned main actor groups are represented, they can keep a watchful eye on each other, and should any actor group attempt to free-ride or otherwise

¹⁴ On the issue of process fairness, see, among others, Albin (2003).

¹⁵ This lesson has, among other things, been learned from the experience with foreign-aid conditionality. For more on this point, see, for example, the contributions to Easterly (2008).

distort the provision process, the other actor groups could intervene and potentially help avert the risk of underprovision or malprovision to which the good would otherwise be exposed.¹⁶

2—FOLLOWING THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE: While it is important for global issues to meet with a global policy response, it is equally important to carefully differentiate between the policy responses that need to take a globally standardized form and in respect to which others countries can be granted more national policy space so that they can then choose a policy path that best suits national circumstances. To illustrate, in order to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases some countries may prefer to create carbon markets; others might introduce a carbon tax; and yet others might opt for a mixture of both plus perhaps offering fiscal incentives to encourage investments in the development of low-carbon technologies.

As the theories of subsidiarity predict, getting the allocation of policymaking authority right – that is, leaving policy matters at the level at which they can best be handled – will foster efficiency and equity, because it helps avoid risks of, on the one hand, over-centralization of decision-making that could lead to over-standardized policy approaches and instruments, and on the other hand, of missing out on opportunities that centralization could afford, such as the benefits from economies of scale or scope. However, as Begg, Grilli and Edwards (1994) underline, policymaking should, preferably, be exercised by lower-level, i.e. regional, national or local, jurisdictions unless convincing reasons for assigning them to higher-level jurisdictions can be mustered.¹⁷

Following a principle of subsidiarity would also be important in order to avoid an overcrowding of international agendas, a risk that is growing because of the increase in the number of state actors that has occurred, as well as due to the growing but still inadequate trend towards more open and participatory international decision-making. Keeping the principle of subsidiarity in mind could, under these conditions, be important to successfully combining representativeness and effectiveness of international decision-making.

3—ISSUE-FOCUSED POLICYMAKING: To help parties recognize and assess their interests and undertake cost/benefit analyses to see whether engaging in international cooperation would pay in terms of meeting those national interests, complex goals like those of climate or financial stability should be disaggregated into their sub-components. Such a disaggregation will show that different global public goods not only follow quite different provision paths but that, in turn, the same often holds for their sub-components.

Therefore, in order to see more clearly the incentives of the other participating actors and the possibilities to tip their incentive structures towards a willingness to cooperate, it could be useful to proceed in manageable steps and foster incremental progress through issue-by-issue negotiation and management.

A more issue-focused approach would also help to address global challenges at the operational level in a more integrated way. This would foster the requisite coordination and

¹⁶ Whereas the term ‚underprovision‘ refers to the provision level of a good that of ‚malprovision‘ refers to how a good is shaped, notably whether it fits the policy context into which it is being placed like, for example, existing expectations of fairness and mutuality of benefit. To illustrate, many might consider the provision status or level of the multilateral trade regime as relatively high. However, they may see major shortcomings in terms of how well certain trade rules support developmental goals and hence concerns of global equity.

¹⁷ See, on the issue of subsidiarity also Sandler (2004), especially the discussion on supporting and detracting influences on subsidiarity on pages 87-90.

cooperation among all potential contributors, across all possible dividing lines – levels, sectors, and actor groups.

4—A GLOBALLY EMBEDDED DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTEREST: The conventional foreign affairs strategies of countries are, for the most part, concerned with fostering purely national interests. When seen from a global perspective, these interests are of a particular, and thus, quasi-private nature. Strategies of this orientation are appropriate in cases where the issue at stake has the properties of a private good, for example, where the country's interest lies in acquiring and securing a particular territory or access for national producers to particular markets.

Yet, in other cases, the pursuit of purely national interests could be counter-productive, even from the national viewpoint. Such a situation could arise, if countries were to race and out-compete each other for the last oil resources, venturing, to this end, into ever riskier and more costly exploration and exploitation. This could lead the world into a global prisoners' dilemma.¹⁸

In such cases, a better strategy would be to recognize the existing global constraints and to explore possible global public good alternatives, notably innovations aimed at producing non-rival goods like clean-energy technologies as well as matching policies and mechanisms that could foster the dissemination, adaptation and adoption of such technologies. Such win-win or positive-sum strategies could be less expensive and more effective for all, as well as more equitable than any self-centered, competitive strategy based on zero-sum thinking.

Some analysts (e.g. Rodrik 2011) argue that the international community today has to choose between, on the one hand, maintaining and enjoying the benefits of openness and cooperating in support of global public goods and, on the other hand, reverting to more closed national borders and more idiosyncratic behavior. This may be possible in respect to some aspects of economic openness, especially policy issues that do not send any adverse externalities (spillover effects) into the global public domain. But many issues do generate cross-border spillovers that could adversely affect the welfare of other nations and, possibly even that of future generations. These issues require the exercising of national sovereignty in a way that takes the outside world into account.

5--LEGITIMATE GLOBAL POLICY LEADERSHIP: Open and participatory international decision-making could be one way of ensuring that the respective 'other' actor groups intervene when they witness free-riding or other signs of unwillingness to cooperate on the part of a particular actor group. In addition, it would be desirable for global – state and nonstate – leaders, individually or collectively, to exercise leadership where issues are caught in global policy stalemates, which result in problems assuming serious crisis proportions.

In order to achieve effective policy-breakthroughs, such leadership would need to enjoy global public support and legitimacy. During the past eras of bipolarity and unipolarity, global leadership was also exercised. But, it was mostly exercised in a top-down way, reflecting the existence of a clear global divide between policy-defining and policy-taking countries. International cooperation was then driven mainly by power politics. As a result, the

¹⁸ In fact, as recent studies on energy security suggest, states have, already, embarked on such a competitive path, no doubt, in part due to the absence of an effective, fair and efficient global regime of energy governance. See, for example, Dubash and Florini (2011).

effectiveness of international cooperation suffered from problems like renegeing, shallow compliance or loose interpretation of international agreements (see, for example, Howse and Teitel 2010; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002/2006), because the agreed-upon, or more appropriately, rolled-out policy decisions had not fully taken into account the often wide disparities in the preferences and priorities of different country groupings. Both, fairness of process and fairness of outcome were lacking, a situation that gave rise to problems of non-compliance.

Yet, as international relations scholars have emphasized for many years (see Hardin 1982; Axelrod 1984), clear and significant net-benefits are important for international cooperation to work, because it has to happen voluntarily. Therefore, it also needs to be incentive compatible – all must be genuinely motivated to support, and act on, what was jointly decided.¹⁹

So, to what extent are these conditions of effective international cooperation being met at present? And how has global policymaking actually been affected by the rise of the Global South?

III The Rise of the Global South in Global Governance

Before examining how the global-policymaking role of the Global South has evolved over the past several decades, one should ask why these countries, especially the least developed among them, should care about global public goods.

The answer suggested below in Sub-section 1 is that, in this age of globalization, global public goods provide the international policy framework within which national development happens. This realization is possibly also the main driving force behind the expanding and deepening involvement of developing countries in international cooperation that can be discerned. As Sub-section 2 shows, this is an involvement, moreover, that has – incrementally but steadily – changed the pattern of international cooperation in a direction that is in line with the conditions of effective international cooperation sketched out in the preceding section.

Additionally, as Sub-section 3 documents, the strengthened presence of developing countries in international cooperation has translated into actual policy change, specifically into greater attention being paid to issues of global fairness and justice, and at least so far, to a swifter and more stable globalization. Sub-section 4 presents the overall assessment.

But first, why might developing countries want to care about an adequate provision of global public goods? How are these goods linked to national development?

¹⁹ Interestingly, as Conceição and Mendoza (2006) show, the costs of inaction are sometimes higher than those of corrective action. See also Nkonya et al (2011) and Stern (2007). However, more than such cost/benefit calculations appears to be needed to bring about actual policy change. Thus, the current growing interest in ‘green growth’ seems to respond to both, push factors like the risk of climate change and ‘the end of oil’ as well as pull factors like the opening up of new investment and business opportunities.

1 Should countries of the Global South bother about global public goods?

Studies on climate change have shown that many developing countries could be severely affected by global warming in their developmental outlook.²⁰ Similarly, studies on the costs of the 2008 international financial crisis and the ensuing Euro crisis indicate that even developing countries that are not deeply involved in the international financial markets will feel negative effects due, for example, to flagging economic growth and added fiscal constraints in industrial countries.²¹ Or, to take the case of international terrorism, evidently, as security measures are being tightened in industrial countries, some terrorists groups relocate to developing countries.²²

In a world of relatively open economic borders the ill-effects of underprovided global public goods can easily cross into the global public domain and adversely affect the welfare of nations. Therefore, all concerned countries must have an interest in seeing corrective action being taken promptly – even if they are not, at least for the time being, among the parties that need to take such action. Successful national development depends on that.

The reason is that fairness and justice of international regimes is one ingredient of national development; and foreign aid is another. Where the former is not given, the effectiveness of the latter could be undermined. In fact, aid might then be but a meager compensation for the costs inflicted by the fairness deficit in international regimes.

Therefore, global public goods provision, including its financing, is one thing and the provision of foreign aid is another. The former is being undertaken and pursued by developed and developing countries out of self-interest, for reasons of allocative efficiency; and the latter, foreign aid is being provided by richer countries out of global equity or moral concerns. While synergy exists between them, global public goods provision and aid should not be confounded. As Table 1 indicates, they constitute two different strands of international cooperation. Confounding them may have negative consequences for both. For example, development could, as a result, be underfunded. Or, the provision of a global public good like climate change mitigation could be undertaken in countries that are not the best providers or through instruments that are not of the most appropriate type.

Table 1 close to here

Therefore, developing countries have taken an important and correct position by emphasizing the importance of new and additional resources as soon as issues of global public goods began to move to the top of international policy agendas.

2 Tracing the impact that the Global South's involvement in international negotiations has had on the pattern of global governance

During the past five to six decades developing countries have, in ever larger numbers and ever more actively, become involved in international cooperation, including issue areas such as multilateral trade which they previously viewed, as Bhagwati (1997) argues, with

²⁰ See, UNDP (2007/2008; 2011).

²¹ See, Griffith-Jones, Ocampo and Stiglitz (2010), especially Part III, which presents developing country perspectives; and ODI (2010).

²² See, Sandler (2004), notably chapter 8, dealing with issues of international terrorism.

considerable skepticism. As a result, progress has happened in respect to all five conditions identified above as facilitating the provision of global public goods.

1—OPEN AND PARTICIPATORY DECISIONMAKING: The multilateralism of the immediate post-1945 era was, of course, not very multilateral, because many of today's nations achieved their political independence only during the following decades.²³ Yet, as more and more countries gained sovereignty, their presence in multilateral organizations was strengthened due to the fact that decision-making in most of these organizations is based on the formula of 'one country, one vote'. Of course, multilateral bodies with weighted decision-making power have also existed right from the beginning, including the United Nations Security Council and the two Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.²⁴

While at first glance the 'one country, one vote' formula suggests a level playing field, even today many developing countries find it hard to follow and participate in international activities because their human and institutional capacity is still constrained. As Chasek and Rajamani (2003) document, these constraints have increasingly made themselves felt as global challenges have grown in importance and an increasing number of issues have required international negotiations, leading to a rise in the number of international meetings.

Forming interest groups has been one way in which developing countries have tried to cope with the ever-heavier negotiation load, as well as to strengthen their presence in multilateral venues. The Non-Aligned Movement was established in 1961 and the Group of 77 developing countries in 1964 (see Ahmia 2009, Willetts 1978). Today, developing-country interest groups exist in most major issue areas. The groups bring together states with particular interest in specific topics like agriculture, or states that belong to a particular region or sub-region of the world, e.g. Africa, or that occupy a similar step on the development ladder, for example, those from an emerging market-economy or a least developed country (see, Deere and Harboud 2011, Yu 2008).

In the 1970s and early 1980s, as developing countries increasingly became a force to reckon with, the industrial countries began to create new, additional and often informal venues in order to discuss issues of priority concern to them. As noted, the creation of the Group of Seven major industrial countries, in short G-7, which was later renamed to the Group of Eight (G-8), is a case in point.²⁵

Initially, developing countries were invited to G-8 summit meetings only for topics that concerned development.²⁶ However, when the 2008 financial crisis broke out, matters changed. In 2009, when the Group of Twenty major economies (G20) met for the first time at the level of heads of state or government, several emerging-market economies were invited to

²³ The founding members of the United Nations numbered 51 in 1945. About one third of these founding member states belong to the group of countries that is today being referred to as 'industrial' or developed' countries. See, <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/founders.shtml/>.

²⁴ For an analysis of the decision-making pattern of these multilateral entities, see, respectively, Malone (2007), Luck (2007) and Woods (2007).

²⁵ For more information on the G-7/8, see, again, footnote 2.

²⁶ This process of inviting developing countries for particular parts of the G7/8 Summit meetings is also known as 'Heiligendamm Process', named after the sea-side resort of Heiligendamm in Germany where the 2007 G7/8 Summit was held. For an assessment of this process, see Cooper and Antkiewicz (2008).

join the Group as permanent members.²⁷ Evidently, as these countries had by then become deeply involved in international financial markets and some, notably China, were holding huge foreign exchange reserves, the industrial countries could no longer ignore these new powers. Moreover, the G20, being an informal entity, might also have been seen as the most appropriate body for testing the step of making more room available for developing countries at one of the highest policymaking tables.

In the Bretton Woods institutions, in contrast, granting emerging-market economies a strengthened voice has so far been a much more protracted and hesitant process. And the same holds for the reform of the United Nations Security Council.²⁸

However, over the years, the developing countries have also formed a rapidly growing number of their own international platforms,²⁹ including their own summit processes, including the BRICS and the IBSA summit meetings.³⁰ Many of the regional or inter-regional meetings of developing countries are being attended by Northern countries because these meetings discuss not only purely Southern but also North-South and global concerns. As a result, global policymaking, too, is becoming an increasingly multi-polar process.

2—FOLLOWING THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE: Although development has had various shortcomings and weaknesses, it has, nevertheless, happened. Albeit to differing degrees, developing countries have succeeded in building up their national institutional and human capacities. Consequently, more and more policy issues that were previously dealt with at the global level could progressively be resolved nationally and regionally (see, Shaw, Grant, and Cornelissen 2012). For example, to the extent that developing countries have built up a capacity for communicable disease control, the need for international technical assistance in this area declined.

The resultant growth in regionalism created the institutional platforms that allowed developing countries to increasingly apply the principle of subsidiarity, that is, to become

²⁷ According to its official website, the G20 Leaders' group is the premier forum for international cooperation on the most important aspects of the international economic and financial agenda. Its emerging-economy members are: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Saudi-Arabia, and South Africa. These countries were previously also members of the 'Finance G20' that had, since 1999, met at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors, and was, in 2009, upgraded to the Leaders G20. See, on this change Gnath and Schmucker (2011). For more information on the G20, see the Group's official website at <http://www.g20.org/> and the G20 Monitor site at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/>.

²⁸ On the IMF quota and governance reform, see <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr1287.htm/> ; and on the reform of the United Nations Security Council, see, among others, Brazil's position of 22 April 2012 available at <http://www.un.int/brazil/brasil/brazil-scnu-reform.htm/>. See also Woods (2010) and, for a perspective from Africa, Serrão (2011).

²⁹ For a list of and information on regional intergovernmental organizations of developing countries, see http://www2.lse.ac.uk/library/collections/govtpub/igos/IGO_web_regional.aspx/.

³⁰ BRICS is a forum of leading emerging economies, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and since 2010, South Africa. According to 'Delhi Declaration' issued at the Fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi, March 29, 2012, BRICS „is a platform for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent 43% of the world's population, for the promotion of peace, security and development in a multi-polar, inter-dependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world.“ The Delhi Declaration is available at the BRICS Information Centre website: <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/>.

IBSA is a joint, trilateral forum of India, Brazil and South Africa. According to IBSA's official website, the group's aim is: „to contribute to the construction of a new international architecture, to bring their (the members' voice) together on global issues and to deepen ties in various areas“. IBSA members intend to address common national concerns as well as to open themselves to cooperation and partnership with less developed countries. See, for more detail <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/>.

more selective about which issues to handle nationally or regionally and which ones to take to the inter-regional or global venues.

However, as noted above in point 1, regional cooperation initiatives cover not only a wide range of purely regional issues but also serve as preparatory meetings for global conference in which the countries of the region try to reach, wherever possible, a common position on key global challenges like WTO matters, climate change and health issues. Monetary and financial issues, too, increasingly figure on regional-cooperation agendas (see, McKay, Volz, and Wölfinger 2011; Volz 2011). As a result, international cooperation is becoming not only a more decentralized process but also a more bottom-up, and thus, a more circular, loop-like process, as depicted in Figure 3.³¹

Figure 3 close to here

Certainly, regionalism is still a policymaking branch ‘in the making’. More experience has to be gathered and evaluated; and there will, no doubt, be room for applying the principle of subsidiarity more systematically. However, even today, it seems that a fruitful competition as well as complementarity between national policymaking, regionalism and globalism could be emerging. Today’s global multilateral organizations, including those of the United Nations system as well as the Bretton Woods institutions could, in future, just be the apex entities of a multi-level global governance system, allowing countries, developing and developed, to regain or maintain more national and regional policy space.

3--ISSUE-SPECIFIC POLICYMAKING: The proliferation of developing country groupings during the past several decades signals a quantitative strengthening of their participation in international policy dialogues as well as a more strategic, issue-specific use of their presence.

Consider, for example, the area of multilateral trade. As Annex Table 1 indicates, some of the groups that participate in international negotiations in this issue area reflect regional concerns, others are coalitions of countries based on common characteristics such as being a landlocked country, and yet others are issue focused. Whereas the G-20, which exists within the WTO context,³² is primarily concerned with agriculture negotiations, including the elimination of export and domestic subsidies and increased access to developed country markets, the G-33 has as its primary role to promote the inclusion of provisions of Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanisms, that is, provisions that are aimed at combining trade liberalization with development, including food security and small-scale farmer concerns. NAMA 11, on the other hand, focuses on industrial tariffs or non-agricultural market access.³³

Besides these coalitions other developing-country groups also play a role in multilateral trade negotiations, including the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and the African Group (Ismail 2007).

³¹ However, it is also important to be aware of the potential pitfalls of regionalism. As McKay, Volz and Wölfinger (2011) stress, regionalism in the finance area could also lead to ‘conditionality shopping’ and thus undermine rather than contribute to international financial stability.

³² This G-20 should not be confounded with the G-20 of Finance Ministers or with the Leaders G-20. For the latter two, see again footnote 28.

³³ A recent study (Jones and Deere Birbeck 2011), based on interviews with some 80 trade negotiators from thirty small states, showed that, proper preparations and coalition building can leverage the limited bargaining power of these states. See also Deere Birbeck and Harbourd (2011).

Within the area of global climate change, coalition formation among developing countries is also ongoing, although the G-77 is also still a major negotiating group. Other coalitions that are active include: the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the BASIC group,³⁴ the LDC group, the group of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Rio Group (see Chasek and Rajamani, 2003).³⁵

4—A GLOBALLY EMBEDDED DEFINITION OF NATIONAL INTEREST: As Ismail (2007) notes, IN THE TRADE AREA developing countries have expanded their concerns over time. Whereas in earlier years they often adopted a ‘welfarist’ approach by focusing mainly on their own interests and wellbeing, they have begun to transcend their own immediate concerns. The group as a whole, so states Ismail (2007, p.2), has become concerned with “advancing the objective of a fair, balanced and development-oriented multilateral trading system for all, both developed and developing country members of the WTO“. Gnath and Schmucker (2011), who assess the role of developing countries within the G-20 Leaders meeting, also arrive at a similar conclusion.

In their interventions in various issue forums developing countries have consistently emphasized the core principles that in their view ought to shape international cooperation and could allow globalization to become an inclusive, positive force (Heine 2010). These principles are inclusiveness, representativeness, multilateralism, transparency, and legitimacy. These principles were, once again, reemphasized in the recent Delhi Declaration and Action Plan that emerged from the Fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi, India, on 29 March 2012.³⁶ No doubt, intentions of South-South solidarity and support at times clash with nations’ national interests so that the smaller, more vulnerable economies cannot take for granted that the more advanced developing countries will help promote their particular interests (Deere-Birbeck 2011)

As the Delhi Declaration and Action Plan also illustrate, fundamental issues of global growth, development, and global governance are being addressed in gatherings such as the BRICS Summits. Thus, in his statement to the 2012 Summit the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, commented on the need for the international community to rethink the notion of development. In his words, “the conceptual analysis that produced the positive BRICS narrative was based on a model of catch-up growth in which supply side constraints were not adequately addressed.“ “Today“, he continued, it is, however, “clear that constraints such as the availability of energy and food for countries that account for more than 40% of the world population can impede the entire story. Water is another critical area of scarcity which needs greater attention than it has received thus far.“³⁷

³⁴ The BASIC group is formed by Brazil, China, India and South Africa. Sometimes, it also functions as a BASIC-plus, namely when the group invites the chair of other groups with which it wishes to consult. See, <http://basic.odandbrown.co.uk/2012/02/28/a-basic-issue/>.

³⁵ The Rio Group is comprised of 23 countries from Latin America formed in 1986 with the aim to conduct consultations over important political, economic and social issues of the region and coordinate positions of member states, including on global issues like climate change, sustainable development, nuclear non/proliferation and disarmament. The Group has no permanent secretariat.

³⁶ For the Declaration and Action Plan, see the website of the BRICS Information Centre at <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html/>

³⁷ The Prime Minister’s statement can be found at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/article3257669.ece?css=print/>.

Similarly, the Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the eighth BASIC Ministerial meeting on climate change took a comprehensive, global perspective on the issue. It stresses, among other things, that the Ministers „reiterated the importance of achieving a comprehensive, balanced and ambitious result in Durban in the context of sustainable development and in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention, in particular the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and the Bali Road Map.“³⁸

Of course, in taking on a wider, more global perspective, groups like BRICS or BASIC encounter a challenge that has also confronted the G-77, namely that at times it is difficult in a diverse world to arrive at a common position. For example, the island countries among the developing countries would have liked the members of the BASIC group to support deeper emission cuts in Durban.³⁹

However, this experience is precisely what has motivated developing countries to aim at combining, as far as possible, sovereignty and commitment to international cooperation mainly by repeatedly stressing the importance of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) as well as the notion of national policy space.⁴⁰

Moreover, developing countries have continued to stress the importance of result-orientation – i.e. the importance of delivery on commitments made. Just think of the many times that they have reminded the developed nations of the still unattained aid goal of 0.7% established decades ago and reiterated in many subsequent international statements, including in the outcome document of the Monterrey Conference on Finance for Development held in 2002 (see United Nations 2002). Calls for the fulfillment of earlier commitments are also being made in respect to WTO’s Doha Development Round, as well as in respect to global governance reforms, notably the reform of the United Nations Security Council and the reform of the distribution of voting power in the International Monetary Fund (IMF).⁴¹

Gentle reminders of developed countries‘ ‘still-to-be-fully-met’ commitments are usually accompanied by developing countries‘ reiterations of their continued commitment to international cooperation on pending global issues, including issues that the developed countries placed on the international agenda, such as the issue of ‘green growth’.

5--LEGITIMATE GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: In recent years, developing countries appear to be taking further, albeit still often cautious, steps towards fuller integration in global policy debates. They are not only participating in global leadership forums like the Leaders‘ G-20 but have, as mentioned in point 1 above, also set up summit forums of their own like those of BRICS and IBSA. In fact, some observers (e.g. Cameron 2011) are already asking whether the BRICS Summit could rival the G-8. Other analysts, however, believe that the BRICS carry a lot of global weight as individual states, and not so much as a political bloc, because,

³⁸ See, for the statement, <http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=21113&tid=41020/>

³⁹ See, the post by Dan Bodansky on ‘Evaluating Durban’ dated 12/12/2011, available at the website of the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions: <http://www.c2es.org/> .

⁴⁰ This approach has also been taken again in the statement of the G-77 and China to the High-level Meeting of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations with the Bretton Woods Institutions, WTO and UNCTAD. See <http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=120312a/>.

⁴¹ See, among others, the Declaration of the Fifth Summit of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum of 18 October 2011, available at <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/>.

as Landau (2012) points out, their economic interests are widely divergent, not all are democracies nor are all nuclear powers.⁴²

In fact, considering all of these differences, it is all the more important that entities like BRICS and IBSA have emerged, adding their joint voice to the international policy dialogue.

By hosting major international conferences, developing countries are also individually accepting that they may have to assume global leadership roles, for example, to play a bridge building role between countries with divergent interests as, among others, Mexico and South Africa did, when hosting and chairing, respectively, the climate change negotiations in Cancun in and in Durban in December 2011.⁴³

Although in many policy debates developing countries still appear to limit their role to maintaining basic positions that they value and to demonstrating their willingness to cooperate on global issues that other countries may have placed on the agenda, a turning point appears to be approaching. Developing countries now present their policy views more firmly, including those on issues of international trade, global imbalances, international sanctions or the international community's responsibility to intervene, the so-called R2P norm.⁴⁴ Also at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change, the BRICS countries played a pivotal role, helping to forge a last-minute deal.⁴⁵

However, some analysts argue that the developing countries at large, notably the least developed ones among them, have, so far, benefited little from the fact that the more advanced emerging-market economies have been able to penetrate the highest echelons of global power. Martinez-Diaz and Woods (2009) suggest that by far the biggest beneficiaries will be the emerging-market economies themselves. Other analysts have queried the representativeness and accountability of the G-20 in general and of its emerging-market members in particular (see, for example, Rueda-Sabater et al. 2009). This is a discussion that has found a first response at the G-20 Summit in Seoul, Korea, when G-20 members decided on a set of principles for non-member invitations.⁴⁶

Developing countries should perhaps not expect the G-20 to resolve the issue of representation for them but instead aim at developing their own formulas for representation and then table and negotiate those. That this has not yet happened confirms, as some analysts (e.g. Ikenberry 2008) posit, that most countries of the Global South, including China, seek, at least for the time being, to rise within the existing institutional order of global governance, demonstrating engagement and willingness to cooperate in a non-threatening way (see also, Beeson and Li 2011; Heine 2010).

⁴² See Landau's contribution to the discussion forum on 'Will the BRICS Nations Evolve into a More Powerful Bloc?' available at <http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2012/04/will-brics-nations-evolve/>

⁴³ For a discussion of South Africa's role at the Durban meeting, see, for example, Chevallier 2011.

⁴⁴ This norm stipulates that where states fail to prevent gross human rights violations as, for example, in cases of genocide, the international community has an obligation to intervene. See ICISS (2001) and the website of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at <http://globalr2p.org/>.

⁴⁵ See, among others, Fiona Harvey's article on 'Climate talks: China calls on developing countries to 'step up' in the Guardian of 3 November 2011.

⁴⁶ See on this point, G20 Seoul Summit Leaders' Declaration 2010 available at <http://www.korea.net/>.

2 From voice to influence: tracing the substantive policy impact of the developing countries' participation in international negotiations

The foregoing discussion suggests that the expanding and strengthening representation of developing countries in global policymaking and negotiations has evolved in a direction that could potentially facilitate the provision of global public goods. Most of the conditions of successful international cooperation in support of such goods proposed in Section II are increasingly being met. The circles of stakeholders and decision-makers are now better matched, and more importantly, the policy positions taken by developing countries have drawn added attention to concerns of fairness and justice, thereby probably contributing to enhanced mutuality of benefit and willingness to cooperate.

However, it seems that the Global North still has to adjust to this more active role of developing countries in global policymaking. At present, the developed countries appear to take issues that are of key concern to them either to multilateral venues in which their voice still counts disproportionately, as at the IMF, or to smaller, more informal forums that they chose to create like the Leaders' G-20.⁴⁷ Similarly, the relatively faster rise of some developing countries in comparison to others has also led to a nervousness among their respective regional neighbors, e.g. between China and other Asian nations (see, Beeson and Li 2012). These changes in international relations have to be taken into account when assessing the global policy impact of the strengthened representation of developing countries.

Nevertheless, despite these countervailing forces, it seems that many developing-country initiatives have found traction in international agreements, and even, been translated into actual policy change.⁴⁸

For example, one could ask whether, without the continuing reference by developing-country delegations to the shortfalls in official development assistance, we would have seen the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 8,⁴⁹ or attained the modest rises in official development assistance (ODA) that were achieved following the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Finance for Development.⁵⁰ And imagine how an even lower performance in terms of ODA might have affected development and, consequently, global conditions like public health, poverty reduction or peace and security.

In fact, without the persistent and engaged intervention of the delegations of Chile and Mexico, who were able to rally strong developing-country support, we might not have had a Monterrey Conference.⁵¹ By now, however, even the industrial countries seem to appreciate

⁴⁷ On this shift in venues, see Kaul (2011). For more detail on the Leaders' G20, see again Footnote 23.

⁴⁸ A systematic assessment of the impact of developing-country interventions on global policy would, of course, require a more in-depth analysis of the complex, and in part also highly informal, 'closed-door' negotiations and consultations that took place, and in many cases, lasted for years, if not decades. Such an analysis cannot be undertaken within the context of this paper, so that the arguments presented below are to be seen as conjectures formulated based on literature studies and suggested here for further study and debate.

⁴⁹ For the Millennium Development Goals, see www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Goal 8 calls for a global partnership for development between developing countries and their external partners.

⁵⁰ See the OECD/DAC database at <http://www.aidflows.org/>.

⁵¹ The United Nations General Assembly resolutions that prepared the ground for the Monterrey conference were, among other countries, actively sponsored by Chile and Mexico. Members of these two delegations, namely Mr. Eduardo Galvez of Chile and Mr. Mauricio Escanero of Mexico, were, in the lead up to the Conference, appointed as, respectively, coordinator and facilitator of the resolution on financing for development.

the innovative perspective on development financing that this Conference introduced by taking a comprehensive look at all measures that impact the financing of development, ranging from domestic resource mobilization to trade, international capital markets, foreign aid, and the international financial architecture. (see, again, United Nations 2002)

Similarly, would development have become embedded to the extent it has in the multilateral trade agenda without the insistence of developing countries? “Perhaps not”, argues Ismail (2007) in his insider account of ‘Mainstreaming Development in the WTO; Developing Countries in the Doha Round’.⁵² And would the Leaders G-20 have decided, at its Summit in 2010, to establish a working group on development if its legitimacy had not been challenged by some developing countries, which did not see their interests adequately represented (Fues and Wolff 2010).

And what if there would have been no agreement on TRIPS flexibility in such a key area as public health? How would the world have been able to cope with HIV/AIDS? Even now, despite the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health,⁵³ efforts to weaken agreed-upon TRIPS flexibility measures such as compulsory licensing or parallel imports are occurring, e.g. by way of transit controls. (see, Abott 2005; South Centre 2011) Similar problems are also occurring in other sectors (see, Maskus and Reichman 2005). Nevertheless, some of the innovative knowledge and technology/sharing ideas and policy instruments developed in the field of health, now, are also being considered in the context of climate change (see, Correa 2012).

It could also be argued that although the 1970/1980 debates on a new international economic order were, from the 1980s onward, steamrolled by the debates on economic liberalization and privatization, the earlier calls made by developing countries to provide facilities to assist less advanced nations in coping with external shocks have stayed on the international agenda. They are just as valid today and have been acted upon in the context of the 2008 financial crisis (see IMF 2011). Also, as with the outcry of developing countries against the first-generation Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) being required before more adequate attention was paid to country-specific conditions and social aspects (see, UNDP 1991), it has taken the international community some time to accept the position of developing countries on capital controls. Now, again prompted by the lessons learned from the 2008 financial crisis, the IMF has begun to endorse this instrument (Gallagher 2011). These and other experiences once again demonstrate the desirability of open and participatory international policy dialogue. Clearly, considerable economic and social costs could have been saved, had more attention been paid to the voice of developing countries earlier on.

Following the Cancun Ministerial Meeting of the WTO, the then Foreign Minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim, is reported to have remarked “I am convinced that Cancun will be remembered as the conference that signaled the emergence of a less autocratic multilateral trading system.” (Mutume 2003) The current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the negotiations on climate change, including the 2009 Copenhagen conference on this topic, have sent similar signals.⁵⁴ Developing countries can and do increasingly stand firm on their negotiating positions because of their strength as rising economic and political powers.

⁵² Faizel Ismail served as Head of the South African Delegation to WTO.

⁵³ The Declaration can be found at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01-e/mindecl_trips_e.htm/.

⁵⁴ For an assessment that considers both the failures and the successes of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference see, among others, Ottinger (2010); and for an assessment of the Doha Round, see Hufbauer and Schott (2012).

This stance has also become possible because many of their policy proposals, especially the notions of fairness and development-centered growth have, by now, taken root and are seen by many, especially the ever-more globally networked and engaged civil society as integral elements of the global normative framework. The governance arrangements of the Green Climate Fund are but one of the more recent pieces of evidence bearing testimony to this point.⁵⁵

4 Overall assessment

The foregoing analysis of the role of the Global South in global governance, thus, leads us to two main findings:

- The circles of stakeholders of and decision-makers on global issues are today better matched than they were some decades ago, because the developing countries have strengthened their presence at all levels of decision-making and, perhaps, also in most issue areas. Yet, while the matching of the circles has improved, it is still far from perfect.
- The strengthened presence of the developing countries has had an impact on the substance of international negotiations. Developing-country delegations have contributed to shaping of various global public goods so that the distribution of their benefits became more even and publicness in consumption somewhat better matched with publicness in utility – all deriving a benefit from international cooperation, albeit often still benefits of different magnitudes.

In some respects, thus, international policymaking realities today are more in line with the five conditions identified in this paper as being favorable to an adequate provisioning of global public goods. And, as also suggested, the fact that international negotiations have become more open and participatory has contributed to an enhanced provisioning of global public goods.

In other respects, however, global governance and the provisioning of global public goods have become more difficult than during the cold war era, i.e. the era of bipolarity, as well as during the brief subsequent era of global governance being largely dominated by the major western-industrial powers. This is evident, for example, from: the lengthening list of increasingly interconnected global risks (World Economic Forum 2012); the increasing reliance on more informal international negotiation venues (Haass 2010), the growing competition not only among firms but also among states in the newly emerging areas of natural-resource scarcity (see, TERI-KAS 2011); and proposals such as those for a selective retreat of countries like the US from globalization (see again, Rodrik 2010) or those for giving up on international democracy and letting the world be run by actors who have the resources to do so (see, Khanna 2010).

International cooperation today is stuttering more and more. A reason seems to be that, due to the rise of the Global South in global governance, the conventional patterns of global governance are changing, but the basic parameters of a new system have not yet been defined. Political power shifts are increasingly reinforcing the economic integration of the Global South in the world economy, adding political multi-polarity to economic and military multi-polarity.

⁵⁵ See <http://www.climatefund/info/>.

Considering the relative recentness of these tectonic shifts in international relations, it is not surprising that uncertainty still exists about how to combine economic openness and sovereignty. In case of doubt, states jealously guard their sovereignty. This holds true for developing countries as well as for industrial countries.

Consequently, many states today experience a sovereignty paradox: The more they try to hold on to a strict, ‘absolute’ notion of sovereignty, the more they find that they lose sovereignty and are exposed to globalization forces such as the contagion effects of financial crises or the ill-effects of global warming like violent storms, flooding or droughts.

So, to return to the main question that this paper set out to explore – i.e. the question of the implications that the rise of the Global South has had on the provisioning of global public goods, the foregoing findings seem to suggest that the growing international political strength of the developing countries has brought us to a fork in the road of global governance: States have, especially since the mid-1980s, pursued strategies of economic openness that led to the growing importance of global public goods and to deepening policy interdependence. Now they wonder about how best, if at all, national policymaking sovereignty and openness can be combined. In view of the emerging natural-resource scarcity as well as the growing competition for market shares, many countries, at present, prefer to ‘go it alone’, i.e. to promote their own security through unilateral strategies, increased rivalry and competition. They rely on zero-sum strategies where positive-sum strategies – e.g. international cooperation in support of such non-rival public goods like clean energy technology – could be the better strategy for all

States’ uncertainty about when to cooperate and when to engage in – constructive – rivalry with each other extends to their cooperation in terms of regulating international markets. The globalization of markets has been allowed to outpace that of policymaking, as the 2008 financial crisis and the current Euro crisis have clearly shown. States have, in many cases, failed in complementing financial and economic openness with global regulatory frameworks for markets. (see, Cooper and Helleiner 2010, Eichengreen 2010)

The main implication of the rise of the Global South for the provisioning of global public goods, thus, is that it has led us to a point in history at which the international community would need to address, once again, the perhaps most basic global public good issue, namely: the issue of world order. This issue was last raised after World War II, when states met at San Francisco to jointly deliberate on how to promote peace and security in the future. They then agreed on the United Nations Charter, including the principles of the inviolability of national borders, non-interference, and national policymaking sovereignty.

But how could one uphold these principles, notably the principle of national policymaking sovereignty, under conditions of economic and financial openness?

Resolving the global challenges that we are confronting today will depend on how we answer this question, that is, on which of the two roads in front of us we will choose – the policy path leading us into a zero-sum world or that leading into a positive-sum world.

Conclusion: Striking a better balance between globalness and nationalness, publicness and privateness

The world has been fortunate that increasing economic openness and deepening policy interdependence have coincided with the rise of the Global South, that is, with strengthened economic and political capacity on the part of the developing countries to play a role in the provisioning of global public goods, in both the decision-making on and the delivery of these goods. The reason is, as discussed, that most global public goods depend on an effective management of cross-border spillover effects and a concerted, adequate provision of national and regional public goods, and thus, on national capacity as well as willingness to cooperate, which, in turn, depends on the fairness and justice of international negotiations.

In other words, we actually have a choice today. We can opt for the zero-sum approach to global governance: allowing all states to pursue narrowly defined national interests, without any or much regard to how other countries fare. To the extent that we care about other states and global exigencies, we could, furthermore, opt for a private-good centered approach to achieving these goals, that is, leaving it to markets to develop and sell new private goods like those we might need to foster more ‘green growth’ – e.g. green means of transport, green building materials, and green energy products. However, the result of such a strategy could be more and more severe global crises, because the sum of the individual efforts undertaken state and nonstate actors may not suffice to meet global reform targets and stay within the globe’s carrying capacity.

No doubt, some actor groups might benefit from such a zero-sum strategy in the short run. But, as discussed in Section I, people’s well-being, including that of the richest, most powerful people, depends on a balanced ‘consumption basket’: a proper balance between private and public goods, and within the group of public goods, on a better balance between local, national, regional and global public goods.

Obviously, people’s consumption basket could not be balanced, if the currently missing ‘foundational’ global public good were to continue not being in there, namely a clear, consensus-based vision of the basic parameters of the future world order.

It seems that if the world would like to continue enjoying the advantages of openness without its current costs, and especially, without seeing states becoming even more dependent on markets, it would be desirable to formulate and reach global consensus on a notion of responsible sovereignty, that is, national sovereignty exercised with full respect for the principle of sovereignty.⁵⁶

Put differently, states would accept that in exercising national sovereignty they will take the outside world into account, i.e. that the policies they adopt will not undermine the welfare and well-being of other nations nor ignore planetary boundaries or the development options of future generations. ‘Taking the outside world into account’ could also mean not blocking international collective endeavors such as steps towards trade liberalization or international terrorism control that, if designed accordingly, could have global welfare-

⁵⁶ A similar notion of responsible sovereignty has been set forth in Jones, Pascual and Stedman (2009), who offer the following definition: “...responsible sovereignty requires all states to be accountable for their actions that have impacts beyond their borders, and makes such reciprocity a core principle in restoring international order and for providing for the welfare of one’s own citizens. In a world of interdependent security, states cannot exercise their responsibility to their own citizens without also exercising it in concert with others.” (p.9).

enhancing effects. But responsible sovereignty would also entail that, for example, states meet agreed-upon, universal human rights obligations they have toward the people residing in their jurisdiction. The principle of responsible sovereignty would require states to act as an intermediary between domestic and external policy demands and exigencies.⁵⁷

Agreement on such a principle of responsible, mutually supportive sovereignty might, however, be forthcoming only, if two preconditions are met. First, international decision-making must become even more open and participatory than it is today, affording all an effective voice in matters that concern them. Second, the benefits and costs of international cooperation and economic openness must be fairly shared at home. In other words, international and national-level fairness have to move in step.

Considering the worldwide advances in democracy, policymakers, who are perceived by national constituencies as mere takers of external policy expectations and prescriptions, might lack legitimacy and credibility at home and abroad. Consequently, they may also not be in a position to help ensure that their country contributes in a fair and effective way to international-cooperation initiatives.⁵⁸ Conversely, policymakers, who fail in their duty to generate requisite national political support for international cooperation, because they fail in fostering a fair sharing of costs and benefits, might lose international legitimacy and influence.

Therefore, the conjecture presented here, for further study and debate, is that a strengthening of states' willingness to cooperate requires states to renew their commitment to national sovereignty by forging global consensus on two closely related principles, viz.: first, the principle of responsible sovereignty – that is, mutually supportive, cooperative sovereignty; and second, the principle of global fairness – that is, national fairness moving in step with fairness and justice of international negotiations.⁵⁹

A consensus-based global commitment to these two principles as cornerstones of the future world order could lay the normative foundation for the creation of the other two – currently missing – global public goods: the establishment of a global governance system offering states effective incentives to tame their temptation to free-ride in the presence of global public goods; and, following on from there, the establishment of a regulatory and institutional framework for markets so that markets could function efficiently as well as serve society, both nationally and international, to achieve desired public-policy goals. If states were to tame themselves in this way, they would also be better poised to tame markets – and to retain or regain their policymaking sovereignty. Because, pooling national sovereignty out of enlightened self-interest would not mean 'giving away sovereignty' but just the contrary. It would mean, as Nye (2010) argues, to achieve preferred policy outcomes *with* other players rather than over them, thus multiplying one's own power and strength. However, for others to 'come on board', it will be important to recognize that they, too, want to gain from cooperation.

⁵⁷ See, on the notion of the intermediary state, Kaul (2003).

⁵⁸ Thus, this paper arrives at conclusions and recommendations that are quite similar to those presented in the study on "Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development" (Deere-Birbeck 2011) which concludes as follows: "The contributors show that while there are commonalities, the scope, and focus of the governance agendas that officials, experts and scholars from developing countries advance diverges from many of those of developed countries and puts accents on different challenges[Thus a] basic requirement for progress is for developing country and development-oriented voices to have a more central influence on how the trade governance discussion is framed, both in the scholarly literature and the policy arena." (ibid., p. 10)

⁵⁹ See, in this context, also John G. Ruggie's seminal 1982 article termed „embedded liberalism“.

As states' initial conditions and development levels differ, they would, of course, have a common but differentiated responsibility in respect to promoting a more mutually supportive policy approach to sovereignty. In fact, the international community could consider expanding the current Principle of Responsibility to Prevent and Protect to also include its responsibility to support developing nations, financially and otherwise, in meeting their duties towards the outside world so that all nations could increasingly act not just as a national sovereign but also as an intermediary between national and international, regional and global concerns.

But from where might the momentum for such world order reform emerge?

Several forces of change could come into play:

- A major global crisis or even crises could occur the costs of which would be so high that the continuation of 'business as usual' would no longer appear to be feasible or desirable;
- A shift in the developing countries' approach to integrating themselves in the world economy could occur that would be more assertive and begin to 'rock the boat' of international relations – a change that would, most likely, be highly disruptive, and sooner or later, lead to the first mentioned situation of 'no more business as usual';
- A fuller understanding of the fact that international cooperation 'pays' on the part of policymakers, perhaps facilitated by research and studies, new technologies as well as advocacy by concerned actor groups.

The last of these three change scenarios would, clearly, be the least unsettling and costly one.

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