

Taking a Hint from Peers: Reform Ideas for CGIAR

**Background Paper Prepared for the 2007/08 Independent Review Panel of the
System of the Consultative Group on Agricultural Research (CGIAR)**

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Overview

The institutional landscape of international cooperation (IC) has profoundly changed in recent years. Notably since the mid-1990s, service providers and financing mechanisms have rapidly multiplied and diversified.

This paper examines some of the post-1990 IC mechanisms (ICMs) to identify their main characteristics and the forces that have driven the growth in their numbers and shaped their design.

The purpose is to establish a benchmark against which to compare the organizational system of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The origins of the CGIAR system (CGS) date back to the early 1970s, making it one of the first global programs. It is a global program that, in a way, emerged ahead of its time, considering that most other global programs were created much later. Yet, it now seems that in terms of organization, policy instruments and management techniques, CGS has perhaps been overtaken by some its younger peers.

Thus, it might be interesting to compare CGS with the more recent global programs and partnerships. Such a comparison might reveal how the System has adjusted its organizational structures and operational modalities to today's realities of delivering and financing IC interventions and point to steps CGS could take to further enhance its relevance, efficiency and effectiveness.

Given the severity and magnitude of the challenges facing agriculture today, no possible reform option ought to be left unexplored. As the President of the World Bank recently emphasized: "While many are worrying about filling their gas tanks, many others around the world are struggling to fill their stomachs, and it is getting more and more difficult every day." (Zoellick 2008). Agricultural research will have to help find answers to meeting the dual goal of food security and energy security. Add the challenge of mitigating and adapting to climate change and other global concerns linked to agriculture and it becomes evident that CGS has to respond to a new, expanded and increasingly urgent agenda. Exploring possibilities for reform and strengthening capacities is under these conditions not merely an option but an imperative.

Section I of this paper, accordingly, examines the structure and functioning of select post-1990 ICMs to identify their key characteristics. This analysis is based on a general desk-review of more than 100 global cooperation initiatives operating in different economic sectors and pursuing a wide range of purposes, with a few also addressing research objectives. This survey is supplemented by a description of five exemplary cases, presented in annex A to highlight select key aspects.¹

Section II discusses whether the rapid multiplication and diversification of global programs and partnerships in recent years is merely a "fad"; or whether the emergence of

¹ To clarify, the term „peer“ as used here refers not only to other research partnerships but to other global partnerships in general, including other research partnerships.

these entities reflects changed realities, new challenges as well as opportunities. The analysis suggests the latter is the case. It also shows that many of the newer ICMs are quite successful and may thus offer lessons for CGS.

Against this background, section III then explores the hints CGS might want to take from its younger peers. It compares CGS' characteristics with those of the newer ICMs. The comparison reveals a number of differences, pointing to reform options that could be considered to align CGS better to current realities, tap new opportunities and boost its contribution to agricultural research in support of more balanced, sustainable economic growth and development. They suggest the following **reform agenda**:

- **Recognizing today's dual-track agricultural research agenda**, which calls for: 1) agricultural research designed to support through foreign aid, poorer countries in their **development and poverty-reduction efforts**; and 2) agricultural research intended to support the attainment of **global public goods (GPGs)** like climate stability, food safety, and other aspects of public health that also concern industrial countries.
- **Forming a new Global Office (GO)** by combining the present System Office and the Alliance Office. While the International Research Centers (IRCs) of the present CGS would primarily pursue the aid/development agenda, the new GO would have as its main role the management of global agricultural research initiatives. GO would preferably have a legal status (e.g. nonprofit status) of its own to be able to employ modern tools of international cooperation and public finance, including public-private partnering, and be fully transparent and accountable in its operations.
- **Re-organizing the current CGS into a Global Agricultural Research Network (GARN)**, moving away from the present vertical (donor=> recipient) system to a horizontal network, composed of the IRCs and the proposed new global network office, GO, as its core members.
- Identifying GARN members' most appropriate **place on the agricultural research (AR) continuum**, differentiating between the place of the Centers and that of the new GO, as and if appropriate;
- **Focusing on deliverables** (mainly research outputs) in the identified areas of comparative advantage **and** (assuming that GARN members will operate in the middle ranges of the continuum) **strengthening linkages and partnerships with actors on the upstream and downstream sides of the AR continuum** as well as other potential stakeholder, including farmers and consumers of agricultural products, to help ensure that outputs translate into desired outcomes like poverty reduction or progress in terms of mitigating climate change;
- Abandoning the concept of "donor sovereignty" in favor of a **programming approach guided by considerations of allocative and production efficiency as well as effectiveness**;
- Updating the toolkit of policy and financing instruments to **tap more fully new resource mobilization opportunities**, including public-private partnering;
- Establishing **the new GO with an independent, legal status of its own** so that it is equipped to handle newer tools of research financing and management;

- Forming a **Governing Board** (replacing the present Executive Council) to set the policy and be responsible for the operations of GO, and through it, for GARN's network activities. While some board members could be drawn from the major stakeholder groups, others could serve in individual capacity, based on their expertise and experience;
- **Managing risk and fostering high-quality research** by supporting the Board's work through independent, high-level advisory committees;
- Offering more room for leadership by **appointing a CEO** to be in charge of GO's and GARN's overall management.

These reform proposals and other reform ideas that they may help generate would perhaps best be implemented as a reform package. The reason is that the most important lesson CGS could draw from its peers might be that form and function cannot really be separated. They are mutually reinforcing and could help CGS to ensure continued relevance, mobilize needed resources, foster risk management, and demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness.

As emphasized in the conclusion of this paper, CGS had many successes. Chief among them is the strength of its 15 international research centers (IRCs). These accomplishments provide the basis on which the System can now expand its efforts to respond with continuing vigor to the still unmet foreign aid agenda while at the same time supporting the international community through the encouragement of new and innovative AR initiatives in meeting today's pressing global challenges.

In more detail, the findings and policy recommendations are as follows.

I Key Characteristics of Post-1990 International Cooperation Mechanisms: Establishing the Benchmark

Beginning in the 1990s, the number of entities involved in the financing and delivery of operational international-cooperation efforts has rapidly multiplied. For example, [table 1](#) shows that financing mechanisms for international cooperation grew steadily until 1994. During the last decade, however, nearly seven times as many mechanisms (namely 34) were established than in previous decades.

If one adds to the financing mechanisms listed in [table 1](#) philanthropic foundations and for-profit funds that pursue a double-bottom line (i.e. help meet global public-policy concerns while also realizing profits on their investments), the rise in the number of financing entities supporting international cooperation purposes is even steeper, as [figure 1](#) illustrates.

Kaul (2006) analyzes the evolution of global public-private partnerships (GPPPs) and finds a very similar trend. GPPPs are defined as multi-actor based entities that address issues or involve activities of worldwide reach and sometimes multigenerational scope. They may be concerned with delivery, financing, or both. As shown in [figure 2](#),

the number of such GPPPs has risen from approximately 50 in the mid-1980s to at least 400 today.²

But why has this multiplication of ICMs occurred?

In order to answer this question, it might be useful first to identify the ICMs' main characteristics—e.g. the goals they address; the policy approaches and instruments they employ; their financing and governance structures.

Judging from the sample of ICMs examined for the purposes of this study, the following nine characteristics are perhaps most noteworthy.³

1—Single-issue focus and output orientation

Newer ICMs typically address a limited set of issues, often only a single issue like “HIV/AIDS control”, “climate stability”, or “making markets work for the poor”. And not uncommonly, they concentrate within their focus area, on a targeted intervention aimed at generating a well-defined output, as can be seen from the ICM listings in tables 1, 2 and 3.

Examples of intended outputs are the provision of a new anti-malaria vaccine—for the ultimate purpose or outcome of malaria control; the design of certified emission reduction credits—that could one day be traded on carbon markets and feed into mitigating climate change; a new globally standardized norm, say for the height of vehicle bumpers—to facilitate the efficiency of international markets; or enhanced accessibility for the poor to an existing global public good (GPG) like the weather insurance market—as an input to the fight against global poverty.⁴

As these examples and column 2 of [table 4](#) show, ICMs tend to produce outputs of an intermediate—regional or global—public good type. This means their outputs form building blocks of more complex objectives, be they final GPGs like climate stability, an aid purpose, or a mixture of both.⁵

² Note that some GPPPs are financing mechanisms. Hence, there exists a partial overlap between the numbers on which figures 1 and 2 are based.

³ Annex D of this paper describes the criteria according to which the study sample was selected, the organization of the review process, and the information sources consulted.

⁴ Markets have public good properties, because the more nonrival and nonexcludable they are the more competitive, and hence, efficient they are likely to be. However, they are public goods with access problems. Actors need to have something to trade with—e.g. goods, services, or money. Also, in order to be accepted as a reliable trading partner, notably for transactions other than spot transactions, it is good for market participants to be known to their transaction partner. The poor often do not meet any of these requirements: They often suffer from having few things to supply, lacking purchasing power, and not being known as economic agents to potential market partners like the insurance industry.

⁵ See annex box 1 for a brief introduction of the concept of public goods. For a more detailed discussion on this topic, refer among others, to Kaul et al. (2003, 2006) and Sandler (2004).

Consider, for example, row 1 of table 4, which lists, among other ICMs, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a nonprofit organization, whose main role is to explore the design of carbon emission markets, including the design of related tradable products like emission allowances or emission reduction credits (all intermediate GPGs)—in support of the ultimate goal (the final GPG) of averting the risk of climate change.⁶

Or, take the case of the Institute for OneWorld Health listed in row 8 of table 4. Its main objective is to identify and develop new medicines for diseases disproportionately affecting developing countries and to make them available at an affordable price. The Institute's activities and outputs are thus primarily aid-oriented. However, an unsustainable disease-burden in developing countries can also generate significant negative externalities, and potentially affect all countries (see, Commission on Macro-economics and Health 2001). Therefore, the Institute's work also generates global public benefits, i.e. benefits that may enhance the wellbeing of all, rich and poor.

Being single-issue focused and output-oriented are mutually reinforcing properties: Pursuing a limited concern facilitates being output-oriented; and the latter demands a substantive focus—a concentration on activities that help achieve the desired output.

2—Tailored production strategies and toolkits

While the newer ICMs often share the pursuit of a single, well-defined concern and a strong output-orientation, the production paths they follow and the policy instruments, including the financing tools they employ, tend to be varied. They are usually tailored to fit the good—the output—to be produced and the incentives of the interacting parties.

The properties of the good that might matter in this context include such as: the good's aggregation technology, i.e. whether the good follows a summation, weak-link or best-shot approach.⁷ Other properties that might matter are whether the good is pure or impure public; whether its public effects are targeted or diffuse; or how reproducible, and hence plenty, or scarce the good is. These and other factors determine aspects like whether the ICM has to work in all or only a few countries; whether it can cooperate with a private firm or with governments, IGOs, or civil society; from where and how to raise

⁶ A reference to the website of ICMs explicitly discussed in this paper can be found in either table 2 or 3.

⁷ Consider, for example, again table 4, column 1. The functions stated in rows 2, 3, and 4 indicate that the good to be produced essentially abides by a summation process. In order for it to emerge, action has to be taken in many, if not all countries. Sometimes, summation processes may contain a weak-link. In this case, the overall availability of the good depends on the contribution made by the weakest link in the provision chain. Such a situation can, for example, arise in the health field, in respect to communicable disease control, or also in the area of terrorism control, where civil aviation security anywhere depends on airport security everywhere. The function listed in row 8 of table 4 signals that the good to be produced is of a best-shot type: If it is produced once, it exists. For a more detailed discussion on the provision paths of public goods, see Hirshleifer 1983 and Sandler 2004.

resources; to whom to provide compensatory or subsidy payments; or whom to charge how much for services rendered.

The financial instruments employed by some newer ICMs illustrate well the diversity of their tools. For example, on the resource-mobilization side one can find instruments such as: the issuance of bonds in international capital markets by the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm)—intended to help frontload aid; the creation of new private products and markets to attract private finance as, for example, promoted by CCX and the Prototype Carbon Fund; the use of insurance products and markets as, for example, supported by the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management with a view to reducing the costs to poor farmers, governments and aid agencies stemming from commodity price volatility or weather-related risks like storms and flooding; or differential patenting as practiced, among others, by the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) intended to improve the affordability of medicines, and by lowering their costs, and ultimately, the costs of development, to make an indirect contribution to resource mobilization.

Turning to the expenditure side, table 5 lists payments effected by ICMs. All occur between richer and poorer countries. Thus, at first glance, they all look alike, namely like aid. But in fact, they are not. Rather, they include payments of subsidies and compensation; payments of market-established prices; and rewards and prizes.⁸ The exact nature of the payment reveals itself only once one takes into account the properties of the good being exchanged and/or the economic rationale for the observed payment. So, is it worth distinguishing the various payment types? Isn't all money just money?

The answer is yes. It is important to distinguish the different payment types, because the purpose they serve may influence the amount to be paid; who pays whom; and importantly, who may be the net-beneficiary. In the case of aid it would perhaps often be the developing countries. But this does not necessarily hold when industrial countries “buy” inputs to GPGs to which they attach higher priority than the developing countries.⁹

3—Partnering in implementation

Many ICMs rely on partnering with other actor groups. The decision to partner generally appears to be a deliberate choice. The purpose is to access the comparative strengths and

⁸ To elaborate, a transaction would be *aid*—if the desired good were a national public good of a developing country. Yet, it would be *compensation*—if the developing country were to provide a global service [with diffuse externalities] like biodiversity preservation; or *payment of a price*—if the developing country were to sell emission allowances or credits to an industrial country.

⁹ For a comprehensive overview of newer financing instruments, see the Inventory of International Financing Mechanisms and Instruments on www.thenewpublicfinance.org/.

advantages of other actor groups as a means to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the ICM's operations.¹⁰

The operations of the Institute for OneWorld Health as well as those of MMV are based on such a deliberate partnering strategy. Their approaches are profiled in annex A. The Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) provides another example of a deliberate partnering approach. It brings together the parties that might, potentially, want to buy certified emission credits (e.g. private firms and individual states), be involved in the regulation of the emerging carbon markets (i.e. national regulators), or supply credits (notably developing countries and their local communities).

Judging from the ICMs examined for the purpose of this paper, successful global partnerships seem to be based on the following principles:

- Partners come together for a reason none of them could more efficiently or effectively achieve on their own;
- Partners accept that each of the actors involved may seek a different private benefit by jointly producing an output that will benefit a third party;¹¹
- Partners retain their identity, pooling their efforts and resources only in a limited way;
- Partnership arrangements are contract-based.

In other words, partnering in implementation for effectiveness and efficiency purposes is a business arrangement. It does not necessarily signal common goals or shared values. The partners' paths may intersect only temporarily, for pragmatic purposes.¹²

4—Investment thinking

As Conceição (2006) points out, greater investment and efficiency thinking appeared in the IC realm together with the greater involvement of private actors, who often want to know the business plan of an ICM and what net-benefits their participation is likely to generate for them, in money or other terms like an improved reputation. The single-issue focus and output orientation of the newer ICMs facilitate answering such questions.

¹⁰ For an overview of some of the literature on the comparative advantage of public, private, and civil-society actors, see, for example, Acemoglu, Kremer, and Mian (2003); Besley and Ghatak (2001); Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002); and Shleifer (1998).

¹¹ For example, private actors, who join partnerships, may have nothing more than a business purpose (making a profit) in mind; and public actors may want to enhance their image as competent providers of certain public-policy results and, therefore, embark on a partnership venture. By joining their forces for these different reasons, the partnership product emerges, benefiting neither partner but a third group—the intended beneficiaries, which could, for example, be poor people in developing countries.

¹² These findings in large measure corroborate those presented, among others, in: Buse (2004); Broadwater and Kaul (2005); Kaul (2006); Kettler et al. (2003); Nelson (2002); Sander and Widdus (2004); and Spackman (2002).

The other innovation that greater private-sector involvement may have introduced into the IC realm is a changed approach to project design. The conventional aid approach would be first to collect money and then design programs and projects. The newer ICMs, notably those involved in pharmaceutical research tend to proceed the other way round. They do their fund-raising based on cost plans. And they are concerned about assured longer-term funding, a concern that has, among other things, encouraged the search for new instruments like advanced purchase commitments.

Moreover, many ICMs face tough competition. Just consider the large number of ICMs involved in addressing the HIV/AIDS challenge. In order to attract and sustain their funding, they need to be efficient and demonstrate that they can break even, or better, generate surplus to re-invest in the ICM or distribute among partners.

The new investment thinking (as opposed the earlier fund-raising thinking) actually characterizes a large number of ICMs, including the PCF, the CCX, as well as the Institute for OneWorld Health and MMV (which are, as noted, also profiled in annex A).

However, ICMs that like the aforementioned ones operate in top-priority issue areas benefit not only in their funding from attention to production efficiency but also from the rekindled wider concern about allocative efficiency. Several studies have recently been published, examining what it would cost the international community not to address some of the looming global crises and what net-benefits might flow from resolving them.¹³ They facilitate identifying policy interventions with potentially high rates of social return—net-benefits for individual countries, groups of countries, as well as the world as a whole. ICMs that undertake high-return initiatives might find it easier to attract resources than those in low-return issue areas.

5—Construction of financing packages

From the foregoing discussion, notably the discussion in points 2,3, and 4, it is perhaps already evident that the newer ICMs rely on a multitude of approaches and instruments to secure the financing of their activities. Among the measures employed are: collecting in-kind resources in connection with public-private partnering; charging for services rendered; offering incentives to top up and encourage private initiative; sharing property rights; obtaining and repaying loans; as well as relying in conventional ways, on public funding from traditional donor groups.

The usage of these and other means is being determined according to the type of output to be produced. There does not seem to exist a firm formula. Rather, it is often left to the ingenuity of the ICM managers to find the “right” measures.

¹³ See, for example, Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 2001; Conceição and Mendoza 2006; Lomborg 2004; and Stern 2007.

6—Transaction costs as an investment in efficiency and effectiveness

When reviewing foreign aid literature one often encounters the argument that partnering is costly and involves high transaction costs. But, “high costs” in comparison to what? One reason for this concern about transaction costs might be that comparison is made with the former “simpler” formula of state/IGO-to-state delivery of aid. But this formula belongs to the bygone era of a strict market/state divide and to a time, when many developing countries’ markets and civil societies were still in a nascent stage.

Another reason for the aid community’s concern about the current trend towards a multiplication and diversification of ICMs might be that they do, indeed, focus on aid, i.e. country assistance. Yet, in a highly targeted way many ICMs address one issue, e.g. polio eradication or biodiversity preservation. Their focus is on particular issues; and countries matter to the extent that they can help tackle these issues. Moreover, considering that these issues tend to require very specific provision paths, there often exists no desirable or feasible alternative to what ICMs do. They have to produce their output and then seek to fit it into a broader country and sector context. Understandably, it is rare to hear the ICM community worry about transaction costs. For them, these costs are a necessary part of their overall production costs; and therefore, these costs should—and are being—reflected in the cost/benefit calculations undertaken by actors, when contemplating a partnering initiative (see Kettler et al. 2003).

7-- Partnering in governance

Many ICMs maintain partnering arrangements not only at the operational level but also at the governance level. At that level the purpose generally is to enhance relevance, input legitimacy and accountability by inviting members from all major stakeholder groups into the ICM’s governing board and reaching out to other stakeholder groups or expert bodies for feedback and advice. Exemplary governance arrangements have been put in place by GFATM. These are also profiled in annex A.

ICM boards are often composed of different member categories. While some members may represent the main stakeholder groups, others may serve in their personal capacity—because of the technical expertise they possess, the political clout they have, or the financial contacts they can facilitate. In the case of networked organizations like the Global Development Network (GDN) or Oxfam International, network or alliance members usually have their representative also on the board governing the overall network.

In several cases, boards establish various sub-committees (e.g. for finance, administration, or programming) on which board members serve. The purpose of these sub-committees is to help expedite decision-making by the full board. They are different in their status and function from the advisory bodies that boards may establish to help guide and support their decisions. An example is the Technical Review Panel of GFATM. The members of advisory committees are usually not drawn from the board

membership; and they do not take decisions on behalf of the board. The reason could be to demonstrate openness to professional, independent advice, strengthen risk management and maintain a clear division of powers and responsibilities.

Other committees, like those for relations with donors/funders, implementation partners, civil society, or the concerned epistemic community, also tend to have a consultative, not a decision-making role. In fact, boards generally seem to be stakeholder rather than shareholder bodies.

However, as discussed in more detail in annex A, case 1, in order to foster good relations with external partners, it is important that the ICM is seen as taking on board the recommendations of external partners and stakeholders and feeding them back into its decision-making. Moreover, an ICM's legitimacy seems to benefit not only from consulting stakeholder groups but also from providing full information and ensuring accountability to all concerned.

To facilitate contact with the mechanism's management between board sessions, some boards further establish small executive committees of three to four members. Reference can again be made to GDN. The creation of small executive committees facilitates striking a balance between wider participation for reasons like legitimacy, on the one hand, and efficient decision-making, on the other hand.

8—Demonstrating results to stay in “business”

A review of the websites of ICMs suggests that in general, they tend to follow the usual monitoring and evaluation practices. Given their output focus, it is often clear whether or not they achieved what they set out to do, i.e. whether they produced a vaccine, whether impregnated bed-nets were manufactured, or a certain amount of carbon emissions reduced.

However, what many reports seek to demonstrate and prove is that downward and upward linkages were established with related actors, i.e. that they succeeded in partnering and inserting their outputs into the often complex overall provision path of the good to which the individual ICM seeks to contribute. (See for more detail, again annex A, case 4.)

Demonstrating results is for many ICMs important, a question of their continued existence. This, because many operate in competition with other entities that often seek to accomplish similar, if not the same task. Continued, fresh financing will, therefore, usually go to those ICMs that are relatively more successful than others in what they do. Thus, competition and a multiplicity of entities with similar or identical mandates can, in the public-policy domain, be as efficiency enhancing as in the private-good domain.

9—An independent legal status

In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that many of the newer institutional arrangements are not only issue-focused and output-oriented, but also self-standing, with a legal status as an intergovernmental organization like the GDN; nonprofit organization like MMV, GFATM, or also Oxfam International; or a for-profit firm like Triodos.

A separate legal status is a precondition for an organization to undertake contracting, and thus, often also a precondition for engaging in public-private partnering. For example, if MMV had no legal personality, it could not engage in differential patenting and hold intellectual property rights. (See for further detail Annex A, case 4.)

Moreover, a separate legal status makes it perhaps easier for partners to identify with the ICM than if it were hosted by a large multilateral agency and functioning according to the latter's rules and procedures. This is another reason why private-sector partners in particular favor slim, separate ICMs over conventional IGOs, which tend to have multiple principals (like some 200 Member States), multiple mandates, and large bureaucracies—i.e. factors that are often known to generate problems of transparency and accountability.

In sum

The foregoing discussion suggests that one of the most basic characteristics of the newer ICMs perhaps is that function, operational modalities, policy instruments as well as organizational form seem, in most cases, to be closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing.

Thus, because the issues addressed vary, the institutional set-up of ICMs also varies. Most are designed in a highly issue-specific way. Nevertheless, many, if not most share a few common core characteristics, viz. to be: output-oriented; drawing on a wide range of resources and inputs, and therefore, relying on partnerships in both their governance and operations; marked by investment thinking and business models; and maintaining a separate identity, often based on a legal status of their own. Many of these characteristics also make it possible for the ICMs to demonstrate performance, a requirement that often determines their continued funding as well as funding success.

II Fad or Functional Form? Explaining the Design of the Newer ICMs

Among the factors that have contributed to the observed growth in the number of ICMs and to shaping their design seem to be the following: the greater openness of national borders; the intensifying urgency of some global challenges; the rebalanced role of markets and states that has emerged since the mid-1980s; the fact that development, however inadequate, has occurred over the past several decades and led to greater

sophistication of markets and states; and last but not least, strengthened expectations in terms of participatory governance, transparency and accountability.

As the following discussion will show, today's realities call for more targeted, issue-focused and output-oriented interventions —lest “bads” roam the global public domain. At the same time, current realities also offer new opportunities to achieve improved result-orientation, including through public-private partnering and networking arrangements, approaches, which encourage a more global, world-spanning approach to international cooperation.

Thus, the newer ICMs are not merely a fad, nor an aberration. They are a fitting form for the challenges at hand.

In more detail, the main forces, to which the ICMs respond, include the following.

1—Greater openness of national borders

As tables 1 to 3 reveal, many of the new organizational mechanisms address global challenges like communicable diseases or global environmental concerns. Thus, it appears that greater openness of national borders and the resultant policy interdependence among countries is one of the key drivers of international cooperation entity proliferation. This may have two main reasons.

First, several global mechanisms are charged with fighting undesirable cross-border spillovers like the spread of communicable diseases or encouraging positive cross-border externalities like the spread of information and knowledge. Second, others seek to encourage policy harmonization behind national borders like the roll-out of global norms and policies that are viewed as key ingredients for a good business climate, and thus, as critical to market expansion and integration.

Put differently, one major purpose of global programs and partnerships is to support managing globalization—fostering its spread, correcting its downsides, and assisting developing countries in accessing and attracting the new opportunities that globalization presents. They are concerned with the provision of GPGs.

As a result, IC today faces a dual-track agenda: on one track, the still long agenda of aid and development, most notably the achievement of the MDGs; and on the other track, the adequate provision of GPGs. This is especially evident when examining the names of the newer ICMs referred to in this paper. Annex tables 1 and 3 are especially informative in this respect.

2—Increased urgency of global challenges

A prime example of global challenges approaching critical limits is the risk of global warming, which, if left unaddressed, could not only entail high costs in terms of corrective action but also cause irreversible change in climatic conditions. Other

examples are the HIV/AIDS pandemic, global inequity, and the looming crises of energy and food insecurity.

Many global programs and partnerships have been created for the explicit purpose of undertaking research and development (R&D) on products and policy tools that could help address these and other global challenges effectively, efficiently and equitably.

3—Rebalanced role between markets and states

The policy shifts toward privatization and economic liberalization that began in the mid-1980s have gradually generated an understanding of the comparative strengths of public and private actors that has opened the door to increased public-private partnering.

The road towards public-private partnering and greater use of market-based instruments has, by no means, been smooth; it still is not. But important lessons have been learnt; instruments have been refined; new roles for governments (e.g. in terms of regulation and supervision) defined; and new obligations for private actors agreed upon.

Moreover, civil society has begun to pursue public policy concerns (like environmental sustainability or “no child labor”) directly with firms, encouraging the latter to pay added attention to corporate social responsibility and creating the conditions for firms to pursue a double-bottom line. Individuals, too, are becoming more involved, notably via the Internet.

Recognizing this growing contribution of private actors to meeting public-policy concerns and global challenges, governments and intergovernmental entities have placed greater emphasis on incentivizing desirable private inputs to public-policy initiatives, providing a further boost to public-private partnering, including the growth of public-private partnerships, nationally and internationally. IGOs like governments now act more as facilitators than direct producers of public-policy outcomes.¹⁴

4—Greater sophistication of markets and state institutions

The development achievements of the past six to seven decades can be assessed from two perspectives. The first perspective concerns the development of developing countries. This process has had shortfalls. But it also has had successes, including in terms of capacity building in developing countries. As a result, developing countries today can better access opportunities like knowledge, technologies and private finance. And market actors are today more prepared to reach out to developing countries, for either investment or trade.

A second perspective concerns the growing sophistication and diversification of markets, firms and state institutions--worldwide. For example, markets are now offering new insurance and other risk management products like weather insurance, commodity

¹⁴ For a more detailed discussion on this point, see Kaul and Conceição (2006).

options and futures, or catastrophe bonds that often work better for individual farmers, governments, or a country as a whole than earlier (inter)governmental mechanisms like international commodity agreements or buffer stocks.¹⁵ Together with the greater openness that also marks the dividing lines between the private and public sectors, these trends have opened up new opportunities for public-private partnering.

5—Strengthened expectations in terms of participatory governance, transparency and accountability

The public’s expectations in terms of participation in governance today extend far beyond periodic participation in elections. People now expect both state and nonstate actors to function in a transparent and accountable way and to seek feedback and input from potential clients and beneficiaries as well as other potential stakeholders.

These expectations can also be seen in the structure and functioning of ICMs, notably in the composition of their boards, consultations they hold on project design, as well as the information they provide to the public, e.g. via their websites (and thus, permit external reviewers to undertake surveys such as the present one).

In sum

The changed global reality of policymaking—the new challenges that globalization has brought about and the new opportunities that the rebalanced roles of markets and states present—has been the force behind the evolution in the institutional landscape of international cooperation. Therefore, the new types of ICMs seem to be more than a passing institutional fashion. They are likely to be here to stay. They seek to respond to the new policy challenges with added efficiency and effectiveness, taking advantage of new opportunities. And as various studies (e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2002) have shown, they are, for the most part, quite successful.

Thus, the question is what lessons CGS could learn from its younger peers, the newer ICMs. Section III will turn to this question.

III The Change Potential: Comparing CGS with its Younger Peers

CGS was founded in 1971 as one of the first “other” ICMs listed in annex table 1. Its origin thus lies in an era of international cooperation, when operational IC was largely aid and country-level focused. Recognizing the risks of underprovision for public goods that countries face, if left to individual country efforts alone, CGS was one of the first programs that adopted a more centralized approach. In a way, CGS was an innovative institution ahead of its time.

¹⁵ See, on this point, among others Kaul and Conceição (2006), and Shiller (2003).

Yet, it now seems that some of CGS' younger peers have overtaken it. This is not surprising. Starting a new organization today and tapping into the latest public management and financing insights is for latecomers often easier than for existing, entrenched organizations.

Calls for CGS' change and realignment are not new. Many reviews and evaluations have submitted recommendations. Some recommendations found some acceptance; incremental change occurred. But the challenges facing the world today call for more than minor on-the-fringe realignments.

CGS today faces problems of path dependency. Judging from self-portraits as well as evaluation studies and other reviews of CGS it seems that the System differs from most, if not all the characteristics that, as discussed in section I, mark the newer ICMs. Its "deliverables" are usually stated as ultimate (and hence, rather elusive) goals rather than outputs; hardly any differentiation is being made between foreign aid activities (motivated by moral or equity concerns) and global concerns that may benefit all; its toolbox appears to be limited; explicit partnering guidelines are hard to find; and most importantly perhaps, CGS is lacking a proper governing board. The current Executive Committee combines several functions that would perhaps better be disentangled.

The following proposals are aimed at two basic adjustments of the CGS: first, to enhance CGS' responsiveness to today's major policy challenges; and second, to bring the System up to par with its younger peers in terms of structure and functioning. The recommendations focus on improvements from a public management and finance perspective. No doubt, these recommendations will have to be further reviewed, and perhaps, revised or refined to take full account of the nature of the AR issues on which the future System may focus.

Bearing in mind the earlier finding of the close link between functions, operational modalities and instruments, as well as organizational forms, the measures proposed would best be undertaken as a package.

More specifically, the following **reform steps** could perhaps help modernize CGS, i.e. align its structure and functioning to today's realities.

1—Defining a dual-track agenda: aid and GPG provision

The relevance of agricultural development, and thus, IC in support of AR, goes way beyond issues of foreign aid, fighting world poverty and helping poor countries to develop. Increasingly, it also concerns GPG challenges like addressing risks of global climate change, the challenge of energy, food and water security, or health challenges related to these GPGs and other global challenges.

Thus, today's IC agenda in support of AR is a dual one:

- An aid agenda—lending for moral or ethical reasons support to poorer countries; and
- A GPG agenda—facilitating sustainable growth and development for all, rich and poor alike.

The implication for CGS is to review its portfolio and determine which of its initiatives belong to the equity branch, i.e. aid, and which ones to the allocative efficiency branch, i.e. to GPG provision. A clear distinction between these two branches would help CGS to identify its net-beneficiaries; stakeholder groups to consult; incentives to provide; partnerships to encourage; or more generally, to select for each issue the right provision strategy.¹⁶

A further implication of establishing a clear dual-track agenda would perhaps be the recognition that CGS at present lacks a genuine global function and office, a fact that points to the next, second proposal.

2—Transforming CGS into a global AR network (GARN), composed of the System’s international research centers (IRCs) and a new Global Office (GO)

The main components of the present CGS are 15 IRCs, an Alliance Office (AO) formed by the IRCs, and a System Office (SO). Both the AO and SO are providing common services for the IRCs. The AO has the legal status of a nonprofit organization; and the SO is an entity housed in the World Bank.

Judging from available reports, the IRCs today are capable of functioning on their own; and also already do so. This allows, in particular, the SO to undertake new functions. Of particular importance would be for the CGS to have a global office responsive to GPG challenges requiring AR initiatives, most notably worldwide research efforts.

Thus, it could be desirable to combine the present AO and SO into a new global office (GO).

The new GO could continue to provide common services to allow the IRCs to benefit from economies of scale and scope. But, most importantly, GO could act as global AR issue manager. This might involve such tasks as:

¹⁶ In this context, it might be important to note that of course, GPGs also matter to aid and development. Consider for example the multilateral trade regime. The level of its provision and the shape of the rules that enter into the regime have important implications for countries, developed and developing. Moreover, developing countries can significantly benefit, if GPGs such as the information generated by weather satellites are being made available to them, e.g. by providing relevant access facilities to them as an aid measure.

- Surveying the global AR landscape to determine whether research and innovations that should happen are indeed happening; or if they are lacking, what could be done to encourage and support relevant activities;
- Encouraging innovation and the exploration of new research frontiers by offering research competitions and prizes for path-breaking contributions;
- Facilitating collaborative research programs on global issues;
- Supporting regional and national AR-related capacity building, without which global research initiatives might be hampered;
- Promoting networking among industrial and developing-country researchers and institutions as well as exchanges between private and public experts;
- Offering incentives for orphan AR issues, even if they are not of global concern; and
- Organizing an annual (biennial) GARN conference.¹⁷

By focusing the GO's activities on truly global challenges and activities that offer clear economies of scale and scope the Network could avoid risks of over-centralization and over-standardization. As is also evident from the foregoing activity list, aid activities would for the most part migrate to the IRCs. The GO might address only common aid issues, or as indicated, orphan aid issues that are critical but might, for various reasons, not find the attention of an IRC.

In transforming itself into GARN and establishing GO, the CGS and its change management teams could perhaps benefit from examining the organizational set-up of GDN, described in detail on GDN's website and discussed in several independent evaluations of this Network.¹⁸

3—Organizing the new GO as an organization with its own legal status

Studies on nonprofit organizations and partnerships suggest that having an independent legal status may improve the visibility of the organization, facilitate entering into contracts with potential partners, strengthen the sense of ownership among governing board members and staff, enhance the entities transparency and accountability, and also help in fund-raising.

¹⁷ In undertaking the suggested functions GARN could often seek collaboration with other entities that serve similar purposes. For example, in surveying and providing information on ongoing or forthcoming AR initiatives, it could seek the cooperation of bodies like the Global Forum for Agricultural Research or Knowledge for Development.

¹⁸ GDN is being suggested as a possible model to emulate, because it also is a global research network and shares with CGS/GARN the dual-track agenda: 1) the aid agenda of supporting centers located in developing regions, undertaking research intended mainly to benefit developing countries; and 2) the GPG agenda of fostering collaborative research across countries and regions on major global challenges. Oxfam International, too, is a network, or in its own words, a confederation. But its affiliates are located in industrial countries, and engage in advocacy and aid to developing countries around a few select themes like justice, including gender justice, basic service provision, and rights in crises. They are more an outreach organization than a professional peer group into which preferably CGS/GARN would develop.

As regards GO, its independent legal status could in particular contribute to:

- Strengthening GARN's cohesiveness: the component centers would consider each other as equal partners and joint owners of the network;
- Facilitating the suggested division of work, with the IRCs focusing on aid provision as their main responsibility; and the GO on GPG provision, for which it could obtain IRC inputs, but not necessarily exclusively so;
- Facilitating GO's use of new financing instruments that may involve flexible and innovative contracting and other legal procedures; and
- Allowing GARN as a whole to have a clearer, more attractive organizational set-up.

It would perhaps be useful to undertake a study and survey among stakeholders on which status would be preferable for the new GO—that of a nonprofit organization or that of an intergovernmental organization. The GDN, for example, opted for the latter.

4—Identifying the place of the IRCs and GO on the AR continuum

During recent decades not only the landscape of IC, but also the world of agricultural research has changed dramatically. At least in some countries, strong national agricultural research systems (NARS) have developed; private firms have taken on more research activities, notably research and development (R&D) on products of potential commercial value; firms, NARS and national academic institutions and experts are cooperating more directly to explore the adaptation of products to particular geographic or socio-economic contexts; and a number of GPPPs and other types of ICMs have sprung up and are undertaking AR-related activities. The Global Forum for Agricultural Research, the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA), and Global Partnership Initiative for Plant Breeding Capacity Building (GIPB) are some examples.

In addition, AR-related issues will increasingly be addressed by ICMs and other entities dealing with global environment, energy and health issues. Thus, CGS/GARN has many co-players and faces competition from several fronts. So, is there really a role to play for a future GARN in this increasingly crowded field of agricultural research?

Within the context of this paper, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to answer this question for GARN as a whole. Better would be to review each IRC from the perspective of what its respective strengths are or what they ought to be in the future.

As regards the GO, however, it seems that the functions proposed above in point 2 are not at present being undertaken in a systematic and comprehensive way by any other entity. Individual elements are being performed, including by CGS itself. But it would be important to introduce a new dynamic of responsiveness and foresight into the AR field that supports public-policy purposes. And therefore, it could be desirable for the GO to

assume the suggested issue-manager role, no doubt drawing on, and further encouraging, relevant existing initiatives.

5—Developing criteria and policy guidelines for strategic partnering

Further considering the primary role of the GO, it is evident that many of the suggested functions require extensive partnering with other actors: those involved in more upstream, scientific AR as well as those involved in the more downstream part of agricultural R&D and the dissemination of new technology to farmers and other potential users: those in the private sector; and those in academia. The IRCs might find themselves in a similar position. For them as for the GO managing forward and backward linkages, implementation as well as governance partnerships could constitute a major challenge.

Thus, it would be important for the GO and other GARN members to develop clear criteria and assessment methods for determining when it would be desirable to partner with which type of actor group and for which potential net-gain in terms of effectiveness, efficiency or equity.

6—Updating the policy and financing toolkit

It follows that the new mandates, functions and partnering arrangements would, in particular, require the GO to employ new policy tools and financing instruments, which could possibly range from greater use of the prize modality to advanced purchase commitments and other forms of public-private partnering.¹⁹ Also the challenge-program modality could be reviewed and expanded.

It would be important to recall the earlier finding that policy and financing instruments should be tailored to the output to be produced. So, new modalities might have to be developed and identified as new challenges are taken on board. Yet, as a first and immediate step it could be useful to review the current portfolio of CGS activities to determine whether the most appropriate tools are being employed.

Also, the current principle of “donor sovereignty” would perhaps need to be re-examined in order to move from a supply driven programming and financing approach to the investment thinking that is typical of many of the newer ICMs—identifying high-return initiatives first, selecting the right tool for the right purpose, and then, should public money be required, turning to potential donors.

7—Creating a Governing Board

Taking other global mechanisms, including again GDN, as models, it is evident that the new GO would need a proper governing board. This board could be composed of AR

¹⁹ For discussion on how the instrument of advanced purchase commitments could be used within the AR context, see Kremer and Peterson Zwane (2006).

experts of the highest caliber from the private and public sectors, policymakers, international cooperation experts familiar with modern public management and financing instruments, investors/funders and other stakeholder representatives, including civil society. The new board would replace the current Executive Committee.

If one were to follow current standard practice, the board might be organized as follows:

- Most board members would be nominated by the main stakeholder and shareholder groups. However, they would not represent these constituencies, just understand their concerns and participate in the board in their personal capacity, with the good of GARN in mind.
- Some board members would be nominated directly because of outstanding achievements in relevant fields, initially by a nomination committee and later by the board.
- The board would be the main policymaking and decision-making organ and accountable to shareholders and stakeholders. It would also nominate the head of the GO.
- The board could draw on technical advice from various independent committees, including a science and program committee. However, these committees would only offer advice; they would not have decision-making authority.

8—Adding scope for leadership by appointing a CEO

While the role and functioning of GARN as a whole and that of the GO will very much depend on the guidance and oversight provided by the governing board, dynamic, proactive management will also be essential. It would therefore be desirable for the Board to appoint as head of the GO a chief executive officer (CEO) with dynamic leadership qualities and experience in managing complex, multi-entity organizations.

Conclusion

The present paper has reviewed international cooperation mechanisms (ICMs) created post-1990. The purpose has been to determine their main characteristics and assess whether they are just a passing phenomenon, a fad, or responding to today's global reality of new challenges and new opportunities. The analysis suggests the latter is the case; and that generally, the newer ICMs seem to be quite successful.

Since the System of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), abbreviated in this paper to the CG System (CGS), was established in the early 1970s, the paper then explored whether the newer ICMs may have lessons to offer for CGS. The list of key characteristics of the post-1990 ICMs was taken as a benchmark against which to judge CGS' relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and governance. This analysis shows that CGS' younger peers, the post-1990 ICMs, have indeed many important lessons.

The main reform step to take would perhaps be to transform CGS into a global agricultural research network (GARN) with regional and issue-specific centers (the IRCs of the present CGS) and a new Global Office (GO) whose main mandate it would be to function as an issue manager of agricultural research, notably agricultural research needed to tackle still unmet development goals as well as today's major global challenges.

Another important step would be to move away from thinking in terms of “funding first, projects or programs later” to investment thinking—the design of high-return AR initiatives and the structuring of finance packages for them, composed of a variety of financing instruments and tapping, where desirable and feasible, a variety of funding sources. In today's more competitive world, this is the more promising route to realizing project/program ideas.

Yet, in applying the reform lessons that CGS' peers have to offer, it has to be kept in mind that most ICMs are still in an evolutionary phase; and that among the most important lessons they have to offer that institutional arrangements must be issue specific to be efficient and effective. Thus, there exist no hard-and-fast rules for reforming the present CGS. Its peers can offer suggestions, not more. CGS' or GARN's future relevance will as much depend on enlightened and committed leadership—forging a new agricultural research partnership for the present first half of the 21st century.

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ANNEXES

Annex A - Case 1

A Lesson to Learn From the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: *Stakeholder involvement*

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, malaria, and Tuberculosis (GFATM) is a non-profit organization registered in Switzerland. Its purpose is to attract, manage, and disburse resources contributing to the reduction of infections, illness and death so as also to reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS on societies.

Given this enormous task, the Fund places special emphasis on stakeholder involvement, actively soliciting contributions from all concerned—donors/contributors to the Fund, implementer countries, civil society, and business, as well as the affected community.

To this end, GFATM includes in its governance structure a *Partnership Forum* and maintains active relations with the private sector constituency, among others through the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Product Red and other relationships with about 60 companies and business associations.

The *Partnership Forum* meets every two years. Its purpose is to provide a visible platform for debate, advocacy, fund-raising and inclusion of new partners. It is an important channel of communication for those stakeholders not directly involved in the Fund's Board (i.e. through a representative). Partnership Forum recommendations feed into the strategy decisions of the Fund.

Important for stakeholder participation is also that the Fund maintains a well-organized website which contains all relevant documents and demonstrates that the Fund places emphasis on extensive stakeholder consultations on all levels, including the country level, on clear procedures for its engagement with the private sector, and on extensive technical screening of its activities.

However, stakeholders are not only being offered platforms for consultation and participation in decision-making but the Fund also makes it relatively easy for them to be informed about what it does, how it undertakes its initiatives, and what the results are.

For more information, see www.theglobalfund.org .

A Lesson to Learn from Oxfam: *A global partnership needs to be global*

Oxfam is an organization with 13 affiliates, including 12 national Oxfam organizations and a central office, Oxfam International. All of these entities are Northern-based.

The organization's constitutions places strong emphasis on the importance of shared goals and common commitment to their attainment. At present, Oxfam's priority objectives are: economic justice; essential services; rights in crisis; and gender justice. Consequently, Oxfam's activities are mainly Southern directed, aimed at fostering development in developing countries.

However, a recent evaluation of the Oxfam confederation noted that the organization "remains predominantly Euro-centric and Anglophone." (p. 18) It continued: "These characteristics affect the smaller affiliates and those outside Europe and of course have an impact on allies and advocacy targets." (ibid.)

This comment of the evaluation team underlines an aspect that is often also referred to as "policy ownership". There exists growing awareness within the development cooperation community that development is a joint venture—that recipient countries today expect to be active participants in the design and implementation of cooperation efforts. Certainly, they may lack resources to undertake particular efforts on their own. But they know the specificity of their country and its various constituencies. Hence, participatory programming is likely to lead to more effective and efficient policy approaches and programs.

As the evaluation report also notes, alliance building is not an easy process. And it requires continuous efforts. One could add, and it requires efforts that have to evolve in their nature over time—e.g. from supply-driven to jointly designed and managed cooperation.

For more information and the aforementioned evaluation study, see www.oxfam.org/.

A Lesson to Learn From the Global Development Network: *Networking around national, regional and global knowledge goods*

The Global Development Network (GDN) is a worldwide association of research and policy institutes. It promotes the generation, sharing and application of social-science knowledge for the purpose of development.

The association consists of *regional research networks*, which in turn draw on *national social-science research communities*. The central hub of the association is the GDN Secretariat. The main functions of the Secretariat are to: to invite proposals for and manage the implementation of global research projects; organize the global conferences of GDN; and provide other core services, including fund-raising for association-wide initiatives like global projects, conferences, and research competitions.

This network structure allows GDN to lend support to knowledge generation that may be of pure national interest, pure regional interest, or of global concern. Thus, GDN recognizes diversity as well as globality, different as well as common concerns and perspectives. It fosters national and regional capacity building, because it realizes that high-quality research on global themes often requires reliable inputs from many sides. National and regional capacity building and networking are an ingredient of high-quality global studies.

Moreover, undertaking research together and building global research communities also contributes to narrowing policy differences that might otherwise exist and impede international cooperation and development.

GDN is a relatively young organization. It was founded in 2000. Its current structure has not evolved without much debate; and it is still evolving, as also GDN's evaluation studies and annual reports indicate.


For more information see www.gdn.org .

A Lesson to Learn From the Medicines for Malaria Venture and the Institute for OneWorld Health: *Product focus and moving the partnership product through the production cycle*

Both, the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) and the Institute for OneWorld Health are involved in research and development of new pharmaceutical products for the poor.

As the Institute states in describing its business model, many promising drug candidates are discarded by private companies for lack of effective demand and a viable market. By fostering partnerships between various public and private actors OneWorld Health moves promising product beginnings forward and ensures that they are affordable for, and being delivered to, the poor. The figure below depicts this business model.

Annex Figure A.1: The business model of the Institute for OneWorld Health*



Source: www.oneworldhealth.org/business/index.php


MMV follows a similar approach. Its purpose is to encourage the private pharmaceutical industry to provide affordable drugs—in this case, antimalarial drugs—for distribution and sale in developing countries, at prices that are affordable to the poor.

As shown in Annex figure A.2, MMV—which like the Institute for OneWorld Health is a nonprofit entity—has a two-part strategy for incentivizing private firms to enter into a partnership venture for this purpose. First, it supports its private partners through the contributions it receives from donors (governments, IGOs, foundations, and other civil-society organizations); and second, it negotiates differential patenting arrangements, according to which the intellectual property rights of the private business partner cover the richer, industrial country markets, and those of MMV developing country markets.

A recent evaluation of MMV stressed, it would be important for MMV to assess carefully all forward and backward linkages. For example, MMV was urged to accord greater attention to partnering towards the “lower” end of the provision process: to reach out to partners who could take on the responsibility of actually delivering the medicines.

Annex Figure A.2

Differential Patenting: The Case of the Medicines for Malaria Venture



Source: www.mmv.org

A Further Lesson to Learn from Oxfam

Clarifying rights and responsibilities to avoid conflict in complex networks

Like CGIAR Oxfam is a complex network composed of several legally independent entities.

In order to avoid competition and conflict among its various members, the Oxfam network has defined a Code of Conduct, setting out the rights and responsibilities of member organizations, aimed at fostering, on the one hand, the cohesiveness of the network, and on the other hand, guaranteeing all members a certain activity space that others shall not violate.

The Code of Conduct emphasizes, among other things, the importance of information sharing as a precondition of coordination and cooperation. Especially interesting in this respect is part 2 of the Code of Conduct, calling on members not to engage in new, additional activities, including fund-raising efforts, without before informing network members.

For the full text of the Code of Conduct adopted in 2003, see www.oxfam.org/.

Annex B - Table 1

Selected financing mechanisms supporting international cooperation, 1930–present

Intergovernmental entities	Date	Other mechanisms
Bank for International Settlements	1930	
International Monetary Fund	1945	
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank	1945	
United Nations Children's Fund	1946	
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	1950	
International Organization for Migration	1951	
International Finance Corporation/World Bank	1956	
European Development Fund	1957	
International Development Association/World Bank	1960	
	1961	World Wildlife Fund
United Nations Capital Development Fund	1966	
United Nations Development Programme	1966	
United Nations Population Fund	1969	
	1971	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
World Heritage Fund, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	1972	
	1972	International Foundation for Science
Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases	1975	
United Nations Development Fund for Women	1976	
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for International Development	1976	
International Fund for Agricultural Development	1977	
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds	1978	
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency/World Bank	1988	
Common Fund for Commodities	1989	
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol	1991	
Global Environment Facility	1991	
International Seabed Authority	1994	
	1996	African Programme for the Control of Onchocerciasis
	1996	International AIDS Vaccine Initiative
	1997	Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation
	1998	E7 Fund For Sustainable Energy Development
Basel Convention Emergency Trust Fund	1999	
Universal Postal Union Quality of Service Fund	1999	
	1999	Vaccine Fund
	1999	Malaria Vaccine Initiative
	1999	Medicines for Malaria Venture
	1999	Global Development Network
	1999	Prototype Carbon Fund
	2000	Alliance For Health Policy and System Research
	2000	Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund
	2000	Global Alliance for TB Drug Development
	2000	Institute for OneWorld Health
Least Developed Countries Fund	2001	
Special Climate Change Fund	2001	
Kyoto Adaptation Fund	2001	
European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership	2001	
International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Security Fund	2002	
World Solidarity Fund	2002	
	2002	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
	2002	International Partnership for Microbicides
International Financial Facility for Aviation Safety	2003	

Codex Trust Fund Global Crop Diversity Trust India-Brazil-South Africa Facility for Hunger and Poverty Alleviation	2003	BioCarbon Fund
	2003	Community Development Carbon Fund
	2003	Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative
	2003	Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics
	2003	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
	2003	.
	2004	Grand Challenges in Global Health
	2004	Digital Solidarity Fund
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture Specially Designated Fund	Proposed	International Finance Facility
	Proposed	.
	Proposed	Global Lottery Fund
	Proposed	Global Vaccine Enterprise
	Proposed	Patient Capital Initiative

Note: For a description of the financing mechanisms listed here, see www.thenewpublicfinance.org.
a. This category includes primarily nonprofit organizations.

Source: Conceição (2006, p. 271-273)

Select List of Global Public-Private Partnerships

Action TB Programme www.gsk.com/community
 Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation www.aeras.org
 African Agricultural Technology Foundation www.aftechfound.org
 African Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership www.achap.org
 African Trade Insurance Agency www.ati-aca.com
 AIG African Infrastructure Fund L.L.C. www.empwdc.com/EMP_Africa.htm
 Chicago Climate Exchange www.chicagoclimatex.com
 CleanTech Fund www.econergy.net/cleantech_fund.html
 Climate Investment Partnership www.climateinvestors.com
 Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative www.clintonfoundation.org/aids-initiative5.htm
 E7 Fund for Sustainable Energy Development www.e7.org/Pages/O-Fund.html
 Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund www.emergingafricafund.com
 Ethical Trading Initiative www.ethicaltrade.org
 Fair Trade Labeling Organization www.fairtrade.net
 Galileo europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/index_en.htm
 Global Alliance for TB Drug Development www.tballiance.org
 Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS www.businessfightsaids.org
 Global Climate and Energy Project <http://gcep.Stanford.edu>
 Global Compact www.unglobalcompact.org
 Global Crop Diversity Trust www.startwithaseed.org
 Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria www.theglobalfund.org
 Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise www.g8usa.gov/f_061004b.htm
 Global Reporting Initiative www.globalreporting.org
 Global Water Partnership www.gwpforum.org
 Green Dot www.green-dot.de
 Hookworm Vaccine Initiative www.sabin.org/hookworm.htm
 IKEA Social Responsibility Initiatives www.ikea-usa.com/ms/en_US/about_ikea/social_environmental/projects.html
 INBio/Merck Bio-prospecting www.inbio.ac.cr
 International AIDS Vaccine Initiative www.iavi.org
 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers www.icann.org
 JSTOR www.jstor.org
 Marine Stewardship Council www.msc.org

Medicines for Malaria Venture www.mmv.org
 Médecins Sans Frontières AIDS drug deal with Yale University and Bristol-Myers Squibb
www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/3/13/60623.shtml
 NetMark Plus www.netmarkafrica.org
 Open GIS Consortium www.opengis.org
 Patient Capital Initiative www.energy-base.org/sef_bonn/pub/sef_presentations/PPP_rossbach.pdf
 Prototype Carbon Fund <http://prototypecarbonfund.org>

Secure the Future www.securethefuture.com
Seed Initiative www.seedawards.org
Small Enterprise Assistance Funds www.seaf.com
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for Health www.msh.org/seam
Terra Capital Fund <http://ifcln1.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/TerraCapital>
Transparency International www.transparency.org
Triodos Renewable Energy for Development Fund
www.triodos.com/com/whats_new/latest_news/press_releases/60888?lang
Unicode Consortium www.unicode.org/consortium/consort.html
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative
<http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/search/partnerships/205.html>
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network www.weforum.org/drn

Adapted from: Kaul (2006, p. 248-249)

Additional International Cooperation Mechanisms mentioned in this paper, but not listed in Table 2

Comment [IK1]:

Comment [IK2R1]:

Global Development Network (GDN) - www.gdnet.org
Global Environment Facility (GEF) - www.gefweb.org
Global Forum for Agricultural Research (GFAR) - www.egfar.org
Global Partnership Initiative for Plant Breeding Capacity Building (GIPB) - km.fao.org/gipb
Institute for Oneworld Health (IOWH) - www.oneworldhealth.org
International Finance Facility for immunization (IFFim) - www.iff-immunisation.org
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change - www.ipcc.ch
International Crisis Group (ICG) - www.crisisgroup.org
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) - www.isaaa.org
International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management (ITF-CRM) – www.itf-commrisk.org
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Specially Designated Fund - ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRRe.pdf
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) - cms.iucn.org
Knowledge for Development – <http://knowledge.cta.int>
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol Fund- www.multilateralfund.org
Oxfam International - www.oxfam.org
World Economic Forum (WEF) - www.wef.org

Post-1990 international cooperation mechanisms (ICMs), by stated function and types of outputs

Stated function	Examples of intended types of outputs	Underlying cooperation branch/ rationale	Examples of ICMs falling into this category
1. Exploring and pioneering new institutional arrangements	Norms, standards, rules, organizations, incl. new markets and new tradable products	GPG* provision	Chicago Climate Exchange; International Org. for Standardization; Prototype Carbon Fund
2. Aggregating location-specific national building blocks of GPGs	Improved national health systems with the capacity to help fight HIV/AIDS or Polio	GPG provision	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; Polio Eradication Initiative
3. Procuring nationally provided services with diffuse global externalities	Carbon reduction services	GPG provision	Global Environment Facility
4. Managing trade in private/national goods of global interest to foster sustainable development	Biodiversity preservation and managed provision/sale/use	GPG provision	Gene Bank establ. under the Internat. Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
5. Brokering market transactions between rich and poor	Win-win market improvements like cheaper medicines for the poor and extended markets for private firms	GPG provision and aid	Clinton Foundation Aids Initiative; ISAAA
6. Disseminating ("rolling out") global norms to the national level	Corruption control, standards of a good business climate	GPG provision and aid	Oxfam International; Transparency International; World Economic Forum
7. Making existing GPGs more accessible for poor countries	Information asymmetries eliminated; access bridges built	Aid and GPG provision	Internat. Task Force on Commodity Risk Management; World Food Programme-facilitated weather insurance for Ethiopia; Triodos Renewable Energy for Development Fund
8. Facilitating pro-poor RPG/GPG provision	Affordable R&D outputs/ products	Aid and GPG provision	Institute for OneWorld Health; Medicines for Malaria Venture
9. Building a global professional/technical network in support of collaborative research on global challenges	Jointly produced/shared knowledge	Aid and GPG provision	Global Development Network; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; International Crisis Group

Note:

*GPG= Global public good

Annex B - Table 5

Not all is aid—Financial transactions effected by post-1990 international cooperation mechanisms (ICMs)


Supported purpose/product	Type of financial transaction	Examples of ICMs effecting such transactions for programmatic purposes*
1. Development support/provision of national public goods in poor countries	Development assistance or foreign aid	Many multilateral and bilateral IC agencies as well as many ICMs, including for example, the Global Water Partnership and the Global Vaccine Initiative
2. Encouragement of developing and other countries/their governments to manage crossborder spillovers or contribute location-specific national building blocks to GPGs**	Incentive payments for state actors , e.g. “weak-link” actors in a GPG provision chain, which can take the form of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ grants, including challenge grants; or ○ soft-loans 	Montreal Protocol Fund administered by the Global Environment Facility
3. Encouragement of private actors (firms and individuals) to contribute to particular GPG or aid purposes	Incentive payments for private actors , e.g <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ prizes ○ advanced purchase commitments ○ subsidies/cost-sharing 	Global Development Network; The Institute for OneWorld Health; Medicines for Malaria Venture
4. Purchase of global environmental services by interested governments through a public intermediary/broker	Compensation , e.g. based on incremental cost calculations	Global Environment Facility
5. Purchase of an input to a GPG (e.g. reduction credits) on a one-to-one basis	Payment of a market-established price	Trading of carbon-related products in the context of the Chicago Climate Exchange and the Prototype Carbon Fund

Note:

*: This table only considers financial transactions ICMs effect to achieve their stated objectives. It does not consider administrative payments.

** : GPG=Global public good

Multiplication and diversification of international financing mechanisms




a. Financing mechanisms supporting cross-border initiatives pertaining to foreign aid and global public goods provision.

b. Investment funds and philanthropic foundations contributing to meeting global challenges.

Source: Conceição (2006, p. 275)

Annex B - Figure 2

Rise in the number of global public private partnerships



Source: Based on Broadwater and Kaul (2005) and inventory of GPPPs presented on <http://www.thenewpublicfinance.org>

Public goods: some basic concepts

Pure public goods—According to Samuelson (1953, 1954) pure public goods have two main properties: They are non-rival and non-excludable in consumption. Non-rivalry means that one person’s consumption or use of the good does not diminish the good’s availability for another person; and non-excludability means that once the good exists, it is difficult (technically and/or economically difficult or impossible) to prevent others from using good. Non-excludability may also imply that even persons, who do not enjoy consuming the good, may be affected by it, perhaps even suffer from it.

Impure public goods—Only few goods have the properties of a pure public good. Many more are impure public, possessing just one of the characteristics of a public good—either non-rivalry or non-excludability.

“Good” means “thing” or “condition”—Important is to note that “good” in the term “public good” has no value connotation. It refers to a product or service or conditions that exist in the public domain, affecting all, in a positive or negative sense, and often different population groups in different ways, depending on people’s living conditions.

The reach of the public effects of a good—The costs/benefits of a public good can be of local, national, regional or worldwide reach; and sometimes, they may even extend across generations. Regional public goods (RPGs) and global public goods (GPGs) are also referred to as transnational public goods (TPGs).

Private goods: the counterpart of public goods—Private goods are typically excludable; and therefore, property rights can be attached to them; they can be owned and traded in markets—against payment of a price.

The provision side of public goods—Whether a good is classified as private or public is determined by its consumption/usage properties, not how it is being provided. In earlier decades the state played a key role in providing public goods. Today, however, many public goods are emerging from a complex multi-actor provision process that may involve government actors, private actors (e.g. firms), civil society, and individual persons or households. In the case of TPGs, intergovernmental organizations as well as multiple governments/states may be involved.

Collective action problems associated with public goods—Because public goods are in the public domain, they often suffer from underprovision. In the case of goods that people enjoy to consume, individual actors may not be willing to reveal their true preference for the good, lest they may be asked to contribute to their production costs. The actors’ reasoning might be that once the good is available, they will benefit from it in any case. This behavior is often referred to as free-riding. If the good is perceived as generating costs or negative effects, individual actors may also be hesitant to finance corrective action, waiting for others to step forward and foot the bill.

Preferences for public goods vary—Just like people’s preferences for private goods vary, their preferences for public goods may differ. Therefore, public goods are often contested goods. This holds especially for RPGs and GPGs, because socio-economic and other differences and disparities are often greater globally or inter-nationally than within a nation.

Publicness in consumption cannot be automatically equated with publicness in utility— This follows immediately from the foregoing point. To illustrate, even the challenge of global climate change will affect different countries and populations groups differently. It may even benefit some. Or, transnational firms may benefit more from a free international trade regime than firms that cater only to the national market.

Some public goods present access problems— This holds for example, for the institution of the market and the Internet. In order to participate in markets, people need means of exchange. And to access the Internet one needs to find first, access to a computer and be able to pay for connection services.

Methodological Notes

The Sample

The present study is based on a sample of more than hundred international cooperation mechanisms (ICMs). This sample size was chosen in order to be able to identify common core characteristics of the ICMs. The entities reviewed are listed in annex tables 3 and 4 above. They were selected according to six main criteria:

1. The ICM was established in the post-1990 era.
2. The issues addressed are of a global nature, concerning GPGs or regional and national foreign aid concerns.
3. The ICM's activities span at least two regions (e.g. industrial countries and African countries); and often their reach is worldwide.
4. The ICM operates at several levels, i.e. the national and international level.
5. Relevant information on the ICM is available on the Internet or in other readily available studies.

In addition, a deliberate effort was made to include in the sample ICMs that like CGS are composed of multiple entities of relatively independent status.

Sources of Information and Aspects Explored

A wide range of information sources were consulted, including self-descriptions, evaluation reports and other studies posted on the ICMs' websites.* These materials were scanned to find answers to the following questions:

1. What are the stated purposes of the ICMs, i.e. the nature of their stated goals, intended outcomes and/or outputs?
2. What are the main policy approaches and instruments employed?
3. How are the ICMs' activities typically being funded?
4. Are transaction costs an issue of concern?
5. How do the ICMs demonstrate performance?
6. How are they governed?
7. What is their organizational status?

Exemplary Cases

* Among the other consulted titles were: Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002; Buse and Waxman 2001; Kaul 2006; McKinsey 2002; Rosenau 2000; Spielman and Grebmer 2004; and Widdus 2001. In addition,

In addition to the general review of the ICMs included in the sample five partnerships were examined in greater detail and aspects of special relevance highlighted in case descriptions presented in Annex A of this paper.

Main Focus of the Analysis

The main focus of the analysis was on identifying the basic common characteristics of the ICMs and understanding why their number had grown so rapidly and significantly. Put differently, the aim was to present a macro-picture—the main emerging traits—of the new landscape of international cooperation and to draw from these insights lessons for CGIAR.

The findings emerging from this analysis are, in the main body of the text (notably in parts I), presented so that the reader can easily see the key characteristics of the newer ICMs and compare them to the current properties of the CGIAR system.

However, it might also be interesting for readers to see the findings grouped according to the above-mentioned seven questions. The table below indicates which points of part I of the present paper contribute answers to the survey questions posed.

Annex C –Table 1

Answering the survey questions: a guide to finding the responses in part I

Questions	Points Offering a Response
1-Which types of outputs/outcomes?	Points I.1 and I.3 suggest ICMs predominantly adopt a single focus and output orientation but are concerned about managing forward and backward linkages
2-Which types of approaches and instruments?	Point I.2 in particular indicates that a wide gamut of policy approaches and instruments are employed, depending on the nature (properties) of the output to be generated
3-What types of financing arrangements?	Points I.2, I.3, I.4 and I.5 show that in line with the foregoing finding, a range of funding sources are being tapped and financing instruments employed
4-Concern about transaction costs?	Point I.6 notes that perhaps due to the emphasis placed by many ICMs on partnering and multi-level governance the resulting transaction costs are not necessarily seen as a problem. They are the price to be paid for increased levels of partnering and specialization—methods that are expected to generate efficiency gains higher than the transaction costs—and hence a net gain
5-How is performance being demonstrated?	Point I.7 suggests that the timely production of intended outputs and demonstrating those is for many ICMs a question

6-What types of governance arrangements?

of survival, since they operate in competition with other ICMs
Point I.8 indicates that ICMs usually have a governing board whose members are being nominated or elected by key constituencies and supported—including for purposes like risk-management, legitimacy and transparency—by various advisory committees

7-Independent, legal status?

Point I.9 comments on the legal status of the newer ICMs, indicating that the majority has an independent, legal status, often intended to foster public-private partnering, contracting, or property rights related matters

List of Abbreviations*

AO	The present Alliance Office
AR	Agricultural research
CGS	Consultative Group system (i.e. the international research centers And other units at present supported by the CGIAR)
GARN	Global Agricultural research Network (the name proposed for the new system that would emerge would the present CGS be reformed along the lines proposed in this paper)
GPPP	Global public-private partnership
GO	Global Office (the suggested new central hub of GARN)
IC	International cooperation
ICM	International cooperation mechanism (a label used in this paper to refer to the newer types of entities that have emerged, complementing the conventional intergovernmental organizations)
IGO	Intergovernmental organization
IRC	International research center (referring to the research entities currently supported by the CGIAR)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
R&D	Research and development
SO	The present System Office

* This list does not include acronyms referring to ICMs. For how to spell out these, see respectively tables 1, 2 or 3.